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ABSTRACT
PERFORMANCE OF THE PRODUCER ACCUMULATOR IN CORN AND
SOYBEAN COMMODITY MARKETS
CHAD TE SLAA
2017
This research quantifies risk reduction and performance of the producer
accumulator contract in corn and soybean markets. To quantify performance, we use three
alternative theoretical pricing models to estimate historical producer accumulator contract
specifications in corn and soybean markets. We then compare the performance of the
producer accumulator to eight alternative agricultural marketing strategy portfolios that are
also used in new generation grain contracts.
The performance measures we compare are: average bushel price that would be
received by the producer, daily portfolio risk, and the Sharpe ratio. The period we examine
performance was between 2008 and 2017. We investigate performance of the producer
accumulator executed during each year, month, whether the contract was executed during
the growing season or non-growing season, and beginning and following an uptrend,
neutral trend, and downtrend ranging in length from 25 to 100-days. Specific to the
producer accumulator, we also quantify bushels accumulated during the contract period.
We find the average price the producer would expect to receive adopting an
accumulator to slightly underperform the average price they would receive with a long
futures portfolio in corn and slightly outperform long futures in soybeans. Nevertheless,
the accumulator significantly reduces daily risk compared to the long futures portfolio.
Indeed, producer accumulator portfolios produced average daily Sharpe ratios exceeding
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all other simulated risk management strategies in corn and soybeans on an average annual
and average aggregate basis from 2008-2017. Consequently, the producer accumulator
portfolio offered corn and soybean producers the best risk adjusted return to hedge
production during this time-frame.

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The accumulator is an over-the-counter derivative product that originated in Hong
Kong equity markets in 2002. Accumulator contracts were introduced to the commodity
futures market by INTL FCStone Trading, and were first offered to corn and soybean
producers in 2005. The producer accumulator is currently offered across the Midwest
through local cooperatives, and commodity purchasing firms such as CHS Inc. (CHS),
Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), and Cargill. Producer accumulator contracts
are dominantly concentrated in the Midwestern states of Iowa, Nebraska, and Illinois. The
producer accumulator functions as an averaging contract that is time-path dependent due
to weekly bushel accumulation over the duration of the contract. The dual intent of
commodity purchasing firms and local cooperatives offering the accumulator was to
provide an alternative grain marketing product and to increase the amount of grain sales
originated from large scale corn and soybean operations (Johnson, 2006).
The producer accumulator offers pricing benefits to producers’ conditional on the
price time-path of the underlying futures contract. For producers, the incentive includes an
offer to sell corn or soybean bushels above the current Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
futures price. To obtain the incentivized futures price, producers must agree to the doubling
up conditions associated with crossing the accumulation strike price and the termination
terms affiliated with breaching the knock-out barrier. Consequently, if the CBOT futures
price rises above the accumulation strike price, doubling up of contracted bushels to
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accumulate occurs at some interval that the price remains above the strike price. For
example, when doubling up occurs, producers must sell twice the weekly bushel quantity
that is sold under normal circumstances where price is spatially between the accumulation
strike price and knock-out barrier price. In effect, the producer sells more bushels as price
increases and remains above the accumulation strike price, but would be limited to twice
as many bushels as contracted. Selling more bushels than originally intended can present
risk for the producer as potential bushels sold could be greater than the expected bushels
to be sold when the producer accumulator was originated. Conversely, when the CBOT
futures price falls below the knock-out barrier, the producer accumulator contract
immediately terminates and bushels accumulated prior to knock-out are priced at the
accumulation strike price, while no remaining contracted bushels will be priced. Thus, the
remaining bushels offered under the accumulator contract will assume full risk of daily
price movements that would occur with a long futures portfolio (Johnson, 2006).
Originating a producer accumulator contract with a producer helps the commodity
buying firm to reduce supply risk by sourcing grain. In addition to sourcing grain,
originating a producer accumulator contract with producers allows commodity buying
firms to become more cost effective. The primary reduction in costs materializes through
lower costs associated with logistics. Logistical costs are deflated by the grain buying
firm’s ability to originate large volumes of predated sales for future delivery at a thirdparty location. Commonly, commodity buying firms target large scale operations with
logistical advantages to store and transport grain directly to feedlots, processors, and
terminals. Focusing on large-scale producers allows commodity purchasing firms to cut
out a substantial share of handling and transportation costs. After the producer and
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commodity buying firm outline the specifics of the producer accumulator contract, the
grain buying firm hedges the accumulator contract through INTL FCStone Trading. By
hedging the producer accumulator contract through INTL FCStone Trading, the
commodity purchasing firm reduces its firm-specific risk by passing on the price risk
(Johnson, 2006).
The producer accumulator is offered in varying contract durations ranging from a
minimum of 16 weeks to a maximum of 67 weeks. Duration is largely dependent on the
structural agreement between the offering firm and the producer. To assemble an
accumulator contract, the producer contracts with their local grain buying firm. Upon
executing, or beginning an accumulator contract, the total bushel quantity offered in the
contract, designated weekly day, accumulation period, accumulation strike price, knockout barrier price, delivery timeline, and service charge are determined and agreed upon. As
with accumulators in equities, these contracts conventionally come with a zero-cost
structure—meaning there are no ‘out-of-pocket expenses’ to execute an accumulator.
However, some commodity firms may charge a servicing fee (Johnson, 2006).
1.2 Technical Definition
Producer accumulator contracts require that during the contract’s lifetime 𝑡, the
producer sells a weekly fixed quantity 𝑞 of the underlying futures commodity 𝐹 at the
accumulation strike price 𝑋 on the defined weekly observation day 𝑡𝑖 , delivered on the
settlement date 𝑇𝑖 , contingent on the knock-out barrier 𝐻𝑑 . While the accumulation strike
price 𝑋 offers a premium to the commodity futures price upon contract initiation 𝐹0 , this
may not hold since the accumulation strike price 𝑋 stays at the same constant level during
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the contract’s lifetime 𝑡. On the observation day 𝑡𝑖 if the futures weekly closing price 𝐹𝑖 is
strictly greater than the accumulation strike price 𝑋, the producer sells twice the weekly
fixing quantity 2𝑞. If on the observation day 𝑡𝑖 the futures weekly closing price 𝐹𝑖 is less
than or equal to the accumulation strike price 𝑋 and the futures price for all CBOT futures
contract trading hours 𝐹𝜏 is strictly greater than the knock-out barrier 𝐻𝑑 , then the producer
sells the weekly fixing quantity 𝑞. If at any CBOT trading hours 𝜏 the underlying futures
price for all CBOT trading hours 𝐹𝜏 breaches the knock-out barrier 𝐻𝑑 , knock-out prompts
conclusion of the contract permanently, fixing no sales the current week, but keeping
preceding weekly sales 𝑞𝑖 effective. Figure 1 visually represents, for ease of understanding,
an example of producer accumulator contract price-time path among the accumulation
strike price and the knock-out barrier.
Figure 1. Producer Accumulator Contract Price-Time Path

1.3 Justification for Research and Contribution
Accumulator contracts have been referred to as the “I-Kill-You-Later” contract.
The general assumption of the accumulator is that it can present unfair risk management.
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This notion arises from prior academic research and literature that focuses on the buy side
or consumer’s perspective for accumulators in equity, currency, and commodity markets.
However, the existing research fails to explore the sell side of an accumulator or the
producer’s perspective. Moreover, while the literature has discussed the makeup and
properties of consumer accumulator contracts using theoretical pricing models, there has
not been research validating alternative theoretical option pricing models to estimate
actual accumulator contract specifications that are offered in the marketplace.
Furthermore, the current literature is void of recommendations to execute and measure
the performance of the producer accumulator in commodity markets (Cheng, 2010).
We fill this void by providing empirical tests that determine the effectiveness of the
producer accumulator as a risk management tool for producers of a commodity to hedge
production in corn and soybeans. By quantifying profitability and risk reduction, we inform
agricultural producers of the effectiveness of the producer accumulator as a risk
management tool. Further, we provide methods to quantify accumulator performance in
other markets. Because of the scarcity of public research on accumulators, and its exotic
nature, grain merchandisers, commodity purchasing firms, and producers may not fully
understand the accumulator contract performance under changing market conditions. We
contribute to the agricultural marketing risk management literature by providing clarity of
zero-cost producer accumulator performance with delayed settlement in corn and soybean
commodity markets to improve optimal use and execution of accumulator contracts.
1.4 Research Objectives
This empirical research focuses on the risk reduction and performance of the
producer accumulator contract applied to corn and soybean commodity markets. We
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examine the producer’s perspective focusing on the common producer accumulator
contract offered to Midwestern farmers by cooperatives and commodity purchasing firms.
The specific objectives include:
1. Identify a theoretical price model that best fits the observed offerings of the
producer accumulator using observed accumulation strike and knock-out
barrier price data.
2. Quantify profitability and risk reduction for the producer accumulator.
3. Compare the risk reduction and profitability of the producer accumulator
portfolio to alternative agricultural strategy portfolios.
4. Provide recommendations to producers for optimal use of the producer
accumulator using back-testing in corn and soybean commodity markets.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review consists of three parts: agricultural marketing strategy
performance in corn and soybean markets, barrier option pricing theory, and accumulator
contract literature and pricing theory. The agricultural marketing strategy performance in
corn and soybean markets section reviews research on pre-harvest, post-harvest, and new
generation grain marketing strategies. Producer accumulator contracts are classified as a
new generation grain marketing strategy and can be incorporated as either a pre-harvest or
post-harvest risk management strategy. Accumulator contracts are composed of barrier
options giving the product its exotic traits. Thus, in this section we examine the types of
barrier options, along with the advantages and limitations of popular barrier option pricing
models. In the accumulator literature and pricing theory section, we investigate general
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accumulator characteristics and research to guide our producer accumulator theoretical
model and the simulation of synthetic producer accumulator contracts.
2.1 Agricultural Marketing Strategy Performance in Corn and Soybeans
Traditional grain marketing consists of cash sales at harvest (naïve method), preharvest risk management using hedging or options, post-harvest risk management via onfarm storage, or assistance of a professional grain marketing service. As derivatives
strategies for commodities advance, more risk management strategies become available to
producers. More recently, the grain marketing industry introduced producers to a new form
of marketing through new generation contracts like the producer accumulator. Using
simulation and backtesting, many authors have shed light on the realistic returns,
opportunity cost, and risk reducing ability of traditional and new generation grain
marketing strategies. In this section, we review pre-harvest and post-harvest strategies,
their performance, and the methods used to quantify strategy performance. Our objective
is to identify alternative agricultural marketing strategy portfolios for comparison to the
producer accumulator, along with methodology to quantify performance of all back-tested
portfolios.
Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin (1998) investigated net returns of 10 pre-harvest
marketing strategies using a combination of options and hedging in corn and soybeans.
They focused on the producer’s perspective, testing the possibility of receiving positive net
returns without drastically increasing return variability. A t-test was used to test for
statistical difference between each pre-harvest strategy and the naïve method of selling at
harvest. Two model farms, one in Iowa and the other in Ohio, were used to simulate the
net returns of pre-harvest marketing strategies. In soybeans, the Ohio farm had five out of
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ten strategies with higher net returns than the naïve benchmark, while the Iowa farm had
four out of ten. The synthetic put had the greatest net return following a normal or short
crop. In corn, the Ohio and Iowa farm each had two out of ten strategies outperform the
naïve method. The Mixed Hedge/Put pre-harvest marketing strategy had the highest net
return. In both corn and soybeans, the best performing strategy had net returns greater than
the naïve benchmark. They accept the hypothesis of higher returns without increased
variability using pre-harvest marketing strategies with hedging and options in corn and
soybeans during 1985-1996 (Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin, 1998).
Bektemirova (2014) analyzed basis trading and basis trading with pre-spreading for
corn and soybeans at varying cost of carry levels from the seller’s perspective. To measure
the statistical significance of mean net returns, paired t-tests are used. Results are based on
daily average cash bid price data from North Central Illinois. Cumulative mean net returns
for harvest time basis trading and pre-harvest pre-spreading strategies at 150% the cost of
carry level had comparable results with post-harvest storage in corn. In soybeans,
cumulative net returns from basis trading and pre-spreading have declining returns beyond
a 40-day storage period. Pre-spreading for short periods under 60 days or unhedged storing
soybeans for extended periods over 110 days are found to have the highest returns.
Unhedged corn storage had positive net returns 60% of the 60-175-day storage period,
while unhedged soybean storage had positive net returns 67% of the 60-185-day storage
period. In both commodities, cumulative net returns to storage were increasing at the end
of the storage timeframe (Bektemirova, 2014).
Like other pre-harvest and post-harvest risk management strategies, new generation
contracts intend to address the producer’s affliction with poor marketing performance.
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Most new generation grain marketing contracts consist of option strategies, preset pricing
rules or discretionary marketing decisions made by a grain marketing service (Hagedorn et
al., 2003). Pricing bushels on a weekly basis over a defined period, the producer
accumulator is akin to the new generation grain marketing contracts with automated
pricing. Automated pricing contracts average sales over a specified pricing period by
following predefined set rules.
Hagedorn et al. (2003) reviewed the unique characteristics of new generation grain
marketing contracts and provide performance scenarios in varying market conditions.
Their study focused on grain marketing strategies based on contracts that incorporate
automated pricing, managed hedging, and a combination of the former. To induce an
unbiased comparison between new generation contract types, the study frames contrasting
price benchmarks. A pre-harvest price benchmark encompasses a twelve-month preharvest forward bid average. To measure post-harvest price, a twelve-month post-harvest
cash price less carrying charge average is benchmarked. And, a twenty-four-month average
price is benchmarked to establish a long run average of pre-harvest and post-harvest price
(Hagedorn et al., 2003).
To simulate opposing market conditions, each new generation contract was
simulated by Hagedorn et al. (2003) during three annual technical trends: up, flat, and
down. 1995 represents the uptrend crop year, 1998 characterizes a downtrend crop year,
and 2000 symbolizes the neutral trend crop year. Example final prices received by
producers during uptrend, neutral trend, and downtrend years were identified for eight
automated pricing contracts, one managed hedging contract, and two combination
contracts offered to central Illinois producers by Cargill, Consolidated Grain and Barge
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(CGB), and Decision Commodities. During the uptrend year, the Consolidated Grain and
Barge (CGB) Equalizer “Post Harvest” automated pricing contract realized the highest
final price at $3.78/bu. The Cargill AgHorizions ProPricing A+ Ultra combination contract
achieved the best final price of $2.56/bu. during the downtrend year. For the neutral trend
year, a combination contract, the Cargill AgHorizions ProPricing A+ produced the highest
final price at $2.17/bu. (Hagedorn et al., 2003).
Wisner, Blue, and Baldwin (1998), Bektemirova (2014), and Hagedorn et al. (2003)
show that positive net returns for certain pre-harvest, post-harvest, and new generation
grain marketing strategies can occur. Our research will add to the current literature on
agricultural strategy performance in corn and soybean commodity markets by providing
risk and return performance of the producer accumulator and alternative agricultural
marketing strategies through back-testing. Alternative agricultural marketing strategies
back-tested will satisfy pre-harvest and post-harvest scenarios in corn and soybean markets
to provide contextual performance comparison. Like Hagedorn et al. (2003), we
incorporate a technical trend variable testing producer accumulator performance for
producer accumulator contracts beginning following an uptrend, neutral trend, and
downtrend. Results will provide further information and recommendations to producers on
expected risk and return for agricultural marketing strategies incorporating futures and
option contracts. The producer accumulator contract is established by combining barrier
options. In the next section, barrier option pricing theory is reviewed.
2.2 Barrier Option Pricing Theory
Accumulator contracts are a portfolio consisting of barrier options. In this section,
we review different types of barrier options and the methodology to value them. Varying
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barrier option types are studied to identify the specific barrier option type that makes up
the producer accumulator contract. After the specific type of barrier options that form the
producer accumulator are identified, we need to value them to arrive at a zero-cost producer
accumulator portfolio. To identify the best and most realistic method to value the
underlying barrier options in the producer accumulator portfolio, we review popular barrier
option pricing methodology identifying the advantages and limitations of each model.
Barrier options were first traded in over-the-counter markets in 1967. They later
became exchange traded in 1991. Barrier option exercise style can be American or
European. American options allow the option holder to exercise the option prior to
expiration, while European options only allow the option holder to exercise the option at
expiration. Common asset underlying for barrier options include: equities, indexes,
currency, interest rates, and commodities. Barrier options are a path dependent financial
derivative with similar features as a standard vanilla call or put option. However, instead
of the payoff being solely dependent on the strike price as with standard vanilla options,
barrier option payoffs are dependent on the strike and barrier price.
Barrier options come in one of two forms: in-option or out-option. In-options carry
a knock-in trait and begin as an inactive option. They become active when the underlying
asset’s price touches the knock-in barrier price level. If the barrier price level remains
untouched, the knock-in option remains inactive, expiring worthless at expiration. Outbarriers carry a knock-out trait and begin as an active option. They remain active, unless
the underlying asset’s price touches the knock-out barrier price level. If the barrier price
level is touched, the out-option becomes inactive, expiring worthless at expiration (Derman
and Kani, 1996).
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Out-options and in-options have either an up barrier or down barrier. The up barrier
stipulates that the barrier price level is greater than the current asset’s spot price. If the
underlying asset’s price crosses the barrier price level, it will be from below. The down
barrier specifies a barrier price level that is initially spatially located below the underlying
asset’s spot price. If the underlying asset’s price crosses the barrier price level, it will be
from above. Up, down, knock-out, and knock-in properties integrate to produce eight
independent barrier options: up-and-in call, up-and-out call, down-and-in call, down-andout call, up-and-in put, up-and-out put, down-and-in put, and down-and-out put. Table 1
outlines all common barrier options by option, type, and barrier location (Derman and
Kani, 1996).
Table 1. Types of Barrier Options
Option
Call

Put

Type
Up-and-Out
Up-and-In
Down-and-Out

Barrier Location
Above Spot
Above Spot
Below Spot

Down-and-In
Up-and-Out
Up-and-In
Down-and-Out
Down-and-In

Below Spot
Above Spot
Above Spot
Below Spot
Below Spot

The producer accumulator maintains a knock-out barrier below the underlying’s
spot price and is therefore built out of a portfolio combining down-and-out barrier options.
Containing a knock-out barrier above the underlying’s spot price, the consumer
accumulator is created from a portfolio combining up-and-out barrier options. Barrier
options are used to create producer and consumer accumulator contracts because barrier
options offer a handful of possible advantages over standard vanilla options. Payoffs for
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barrier options may match the holder’s belief about future market direction, therefore,
eliminating payment for scenarios the holder doesn’t believe are probable. If the holder
only wants exposure or protection over a certain range of risk possibilities, barrier options
may match hedging needs more closely than standard vanilla options. Most importantly,
premiums are commonly lower than standard vanilla options due to the barrier stipulation
limiting coverage to fewer payoff scenarios (Derman and Kani, 1996).
As a portfolio of down-and-out barrier options, the producer accumulator is a pathdependent derivative with its price contingent on the underlying’s price-time path over the
derivative’s lifetime. Because barrier options are a path-dependent derivative, valuing them
is a complex process. Due to the difficulty of pricing barrier options, multiple option
pricing frameworks have been applied to the valuation of barrier options. Another crucial
factor is how the barrier is monitored. Barrier options may contain either a continuous or
discretely monitored barrier. Two dominant valuation methods stand out: analytic
valuation for European-style barrier options with continuous monitoring and numerical
valuation for European and American barrier options with discrete monitoring. A closed
form solution can be found through an analytical framework such as the Black-Scholes
option pricing model. Alternatively, numerical frameworks like the lattice models of
binomial and trinomial trees will not generate a closed from solution.
Black and Scholes (1973) proposed a seminal formula to theoretically price
standard vanilla European-style options in continuous time. The Black-Scholes model
assumes that all assets follow geometric Brownian motion with constant drift and volatility,
the rate of return on the risk-free asset is constant, and assets don’t pay dividends. The
model assumes the market provides no arbitrage opportunity, no restriction on borrowing
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and lending money at the at the risk-free interest rate, no restriction on buying or selling
any amount of the asset, and zero transaction fees or costs. Beyond standard vanilla options,
European barrier options can be valued under closed form through the Black-Scholes
framework (Black and Scholes, 1973).
Merton (1973) was the first academic to develop pricing methodology for barrier
options by extending the Black-Scholes model. Merton established pricing methodology
for the European down-and-out call option by valuing the standard vanilla European call
subject to boundary conditions. Through this, Merton arrived at a closed form solution for
the down-and-out call option with a continuously monitored fixed barrier (Merton, 1973).
Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) expanded the barrier option valuation framework beyond the
down-and-out barrier call by defining payoffs and pricing formulas for eight standard
barrier options. Under their valuation technique, barrier options are valued using the riskneutral valuation approach by calculating the asset price risk-neutral densities when the
barrier is crossed from above and below. The barrier option’s price is obtained by
discounting the barrier option payoffs over the densities (Rubinstein and Reiner, 1991).
The Black-Scholes model provides the advantage of quick closed form option price
generation for standard vanilla options. Nevertheless, it suffers from multiple limitations.
Inability to price American-style options and underlying model assumptions limit the
usefulness of the model. Constant asset price observation, fixed interest rate, and constant
volatility are assumed for the duration of the option contract under the Black-Scholes
model. These criteria do not realistically fit the market. Constant asset price observation is
difficult and can lead to arbitrage as markets maintain dissimilar trading hours across the
world. Constant volatility is violated in practice as a volatility smile is standard, where at-
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the-money options have a lower implied volatility than further out-of-the-money options.
With these limitations, the Black-Scholes model becomes impractical for accurately
pricing barrier options for our producer accumulator portfolio (Black and Scholes, 1973).
Cox, Ross, and Rubenstein (1979) established the CRR binomial option pricing
model to value American and European options in discrete time. As with other lattice
models, closed form solutions are not generated. The binomial model values options using
a three-step process. Initially, a price tree is established by working forward, branching
price up and down by a fixed interval at each time step from valuation to expiration. Final
node payoffs or the intrinsic values are calculated at expiration or the end of the price tree.
Working backwards through the price tree, discounting option payoffs from expiration to
valuation, assigns the option its spot price. Assumptions of the binomial model include:
binomial distribution of returns, constant interest rate for the option’s life, investors may
borrow as much capital as they want at the risk-free rate, no transaction costs or taxes, no
margin requirements, no arbitrage, short selling is permitted, the investor is risk neutral,
and volatility is constant (Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein, 1979).
Boyle and Lau (1994) investigated CRR binomial model pricing of barrier options
when the barrier is close to the horizontal layer of lattice nodes. Increasing time steps when
the barrier resonates between two vertical lattice nodes creates bias by slowly shifting the
horizontal layer of nodes toward the barrier, eventually pushing the node layer across the
barrier. Valuation bias is corrected by adjusting the number of time steps where the
horizontal layer of nodes is close to the barrier, yet slightly beyond it. By adjusting the
number of time steps, convergence to the Black-Scholes calculated continuous time price
is improved. With this adaption, knock-in and knock-out probability is more accurate for
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the down-and-in call and down-and-out call (Boyle and Lau, 1994). Derman, Bardhan,
Ergener and Kani (1995) evaluated slow convergence under the binomial option pricing
method. They establish an enhanced method improving option pricing precision by
minimizing specification error. Correcting nodes at the effective and modified barrier price
levels using an algorithm allows for converge to the specified barrier price level, improving
valuation estimates (Derman, Kani, Ergener, and Bardhan, 1995).
Binomial models are known to provide accurate option pricing results for standard
European and American vanilla options. The ability of the binomial model to value options
with early exercise, American-style options, is a crucial advantage of the binomial model
over the Black-Scholes model. However, the binomial model does not take into
consideration the observed volatility smile of traded options. Valuing barrier options or
exotic derivatives with the binomial model may lead to slow convergence. Slow
convergence arises as binomial trees involve many time steps for accurate barrier option
pricing results. When pricing barrier options, binomial models tend to generate errors near
the barrier due to inaccurate calculations of variance and local means (Ritchken, 1995).
Boyle (1986) extended the binomial option pricing model to produce the trinomial
tree method for valuing European and American options in discrete time (Boyle, 1986).
Like binomial trees, trinomial trees branch up and down from each prior node at each
timestep. However, in addition to the up-and-down paths, trinomial trees contain a middle
path. Because of the three paths, asset price can move up to a higher price, stay constant
moving horizontally at the prior node price, or move down to a lower price. Option value
is derived from the same three-step process as binomial trees, beginning with the
calculation of asset prices on the tree from valuation to expiration, then finding the intrinsic
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values at the final nodes, and then working backwards from option expiration to valuation.
Assumptions of the trinomial tree model consist of no arbitrage, the investor is risk neutral,
the interest rate and volatility are constant for the option’s duration, investors may borrow
as much as they want at the risk-free interest rate with no margin requirements, there are
no taxes or transaction fees, and short selling is permitted.
Ritchken (1995) investigated barrier option pricing under the binomial lattice and
a corrected trinomial lattice. He provides a method to identify the stretch parameter by
calculating the number of down moves before reaching the layer of nodes above the barrier.
Incorporation of the stretch parameter creates a trinomial tree where the nodes hit the
barrier exactly providing rapid convergence for down-and-out options using fewer time
steps than the binomial model (Ritchken, 1995). Cheuk and Vorst (1996) extended the
trinomial tree model to incorporate a time-dependent shift parameter for the valuation of
barrier options. Optimal node positioning for continuously observed barriers occurs when
the horizontal layer of nodes is equivalent to the horizontal barrier. Ideal node positioning
for a discretely observed barrier requires the horizontal barrier to be equidistant between
two vertical nodes. Notably, large pricing errors occur when discrete barrier options are
valued using a continuous framework (Cheuk and Vorst, 1996).
For simple option valuation, trinomial trees involve greater computational time
than binomial trees for similar valuation accuracy. Trinomial trees are ideal for pricing
exotic options due to more end nodes generating accurate and stable valuation of option
payoffs. Trinomial trees efficiently value barrier options and have an advantage over
binomial trees due to a more rapid convergence as time steps increase (Cheuk and Vorst,
1996). As with binomial trees, the constant volatility assumption of trinomial trees does
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not often fit the observed implied volatilities of market traded options (Derman et al.,1996).
When a volatility smile is observed, implied trees are a better fit.
Implied tree models value options similarly to constant volatility tree models;
however, implied tree models assume non-constant implied volatility. Considering
equivalent time to maturity and referenced asset price, implied volatility differs for options
at each strike price. This occurrence is known as volatility smile or volatility skew. With
differing implied volatilities at various strike prices, a smile shape is formed coining the
term volatility smile. Corn and soybean options exhibit a volatility smile or term structure
where implied volatility is greater for out-of-the-money options than at-the-money options.
Guo and Su (2004) show that September corn futures options at varying strike prices
exhibit a volatility smile (Guo and Su, 2004). R.J. O’Brien and Associates Inc. (2000)
found that in commodity option markets, the implied volatility of out-of-the-money options
is almost always higher than the implied volatility of at-the-money and in-the-money
options (R.J. O’Brien and Associates Inc., 2000).
The implied binomial tree model was first introduced in 1994 with contributions
from Dupire (1994), Derman and Kani (1994), and Rubinstein (1994) (Haug, 2007).
Implied binomial trees are used to value complex American and European options in
discrete time. The implied methodology prices options exhibiting a volatility smile by
allowing local volatility to be a function of time and asset price. Binomial trees assume
constant volatility forming a rigid lattice, while implied binomial trees incorporate local
volatility and liquid option prices to create a flexible lattice. A flexible lattice allows
differing local volatility from node to node. Using interpolation of market option prices,
the location and probability of touching each node is calculated for all strikes and
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expirations in the price tree. The implied binomial tree model requires that there are no
preferences or arbitrage, the risk neutrality assumption holds, and the model properly
reproduces the volatility smile observed in the marketplace (Derman and Kani, 1994).
Derman and Kani (1994) believed pricing barrier options using the implied
framework will be beneficial where the probability of hitting the knock-out barrier is
sensitive to the structure of the volatility smile. Because four parameters are involved,
options values are generated efficiently and quickly. With the ability to adjust to uneven
volatilities across several option strikes and expirations, implied binomial trees are known
to generate superior dependability and elasticity than other option pricing models. The most
accurate values for complex options are attainable when market option prices are liquid
and transition probabilities remain positive (Derman and Kani, 1994). This methodology
works proficiently for many situations, but it runs into issues when modifications are
required, market option prices suffer from illiquidity, and negative transition probabilities
occur. Most importantly, a well-structured lattice is unattainable when market option prices
are inconsistent (Derman et al., 1996).
The implied trinomial tree (ITT) methodology is frequently applied to the valuation
of complex options, particularly in option markets that demonstrate a persistent volatility
smile. Implied trinomial trees are the implied volatility extension of the constant volatility
trinomial tree. Constant volatility trinomial trees create a regular mesh; implied trinomial
trees produce an irregular mesh. Because implied trinomial trees fit the observed market
volatility smile, they are akin to implied binomial trees. However, implied binomial trees
contain four parameters, while implied trinomial trees include five parameters. For accurate
option valuation the implied trinomial tree model requires: transition probabilities to be
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between zero and one to prevent arbitrage, fulfillment of the risk neutrality assumption,
and appropriately replication of the volatility smile (Derman et al., 1996).
Having an extra parameter permits implied trinomial trees to duplicate a greater
domain of volatility structures than implied binomial trees. Duplication of additional
volatility structures allows for greater flexibility and consistency in fitting volatilities
across option strikes and expirations (Haug, 2007). Users choose the state space or price at
each node in the tree. This advantage allows implied trinomial trees to create a better fit to
the volatility smile when market prices are inconsistent or violate the arbitrage assumption.
On the downside, an additional parameter largely means greater computational time
(Derman et al., 1996).
2.3 Accumulator Contract Literature and Pricing Theory
In this section of the literature review, we analyze accumulator contracts in multiple
asset classes. Our objective is to gain an understanding of the pricing methodology and
mechanics underlying the producer accumulator contract. There is limited producer
accumulator pricing methodology and literature in commodities or any other asset class.
We have access to some INTL FCStone contract information. Therefore, we rely on
producer accumulator contract information to model a producer accumulator portfolio
maintaining pricing and contract characteristics that are consistent with the INTL FCStone
producer accumulator contract offered in corn and soybean commodity markets. However,
consumer accumulator research and information is more abundant, so we also focus on
research, theoretical pricing framework, and simulation results affiliated with the consumer
accumulator contract.
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Accumulator contracts come in two forms: producer accumulator and consumer
accumulator. Producer accumulators allow for decumulation of the underlying asset;
consumer accumulators allow for accumulation of the underlying asset. The producer
accumulator requires the contract holder to sell a specified quantity of the referenced asset
at a higher price than the referenced asset’s price at contract origination with the constraint
of the accumulation strike price spatially located above the asset’s price at origination and
a knock-out barrier price spatially located below the asset’s price at origination.
Alternatively, the consumer accumulator requires the contract holder to buy a specified
quantity of the referenced asset at a lower price than the referenced asset’s price at contract
origination with the stipulation of the knock-out barrier price spatially located above the
asset’s price at origination and an accumulation strike price spatially located below the
asset’s price at origination. INTL FCStone Trading Company introduced accumulator
contracts to commodity markets in the United States, allowing grain producers and
consumers access to a new grain marketing tool. Grain producers, such as row crop farmers
of corn and soybeans, sell their new or old crop production via the producer accumulator
contract. Grain consumers, such as livestock firms, grain processors, and ethanol plants,
accumulate grain through the consumer accumulator contract.
Consumer accumulators follow that during the contract’s lifetime 𝑡, the consumer
buys a fixed quantity 𝑞 of the underlying stock 𝑆 at the accumulation strike price 𝑋 on the
defined observation day 𝑡𝑖 , delivered on the settlement date 𝑇𝑖 , contingent on the
continuous knock-out barrier 𝐻𝑐 . Standard consumer accumulator contracts maintain a
zero-cost structure, requiring investors to pay no up-front premium to establish the
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contract. Lam, Yu, and Xin (2009) provide payoffs for the zero-cost accumulator with
delayed settlement and continuous knock-out barrier monitoring defined as,
(1) 0

𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏≤𝑡𝑖 𝑆𝜏 ≥ 𝐻𝑐

(2) 𝑆𝑇𝑖 − 𝑋

𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏≤𝑡𝑖 𝑆𝜏 < 𝐻𝑐 , 𝑆𝑡𝑖 ≥ 𝑋

(3) 2(𝑆𝑇𝑖 − 𝑋)

𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏≤𝑡𝑖 𝑆𝜏 < 𝐻𝑐 , 𝑆𝑡𝑖 < 𝑋

where 𝑆𝑡𝑖 is the stock price on the observation day, 𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the stock price on the settlement
day, 𝑆𝜏 is the continuous stock price, 𝑋 is the accumulation strike price, 𝐻𝑐 is the knockout barrier price with continuous monitoring, 𝑡𝑖 is the observation day, 𝜏 is the continuously
observed price for all time, and 𝑇𝑖 is the maturity date of the forward contract (Lam et al.,
2009).
The first payoff is zero. It follows that if at any trading hours 𝜏 the underlying stock
price for all trading hours 𝑆𝜏 is greater than or equal to the continuous knock-out barrier
price 𝐻𝑐 , knock out prompts conclusion of the contract permanently, fixing no sales on the
current observation day 𝑡𝑖 , but leaving former fixed sales 𝑞𝑖 effective. The second payoff
is the difference between the stock price on the settlement day 𝑆𝑇𝑖 and the accumulation
strike price 𝑋. It follows that the stock price for all trading hours 𝑆𝜏 is strictly less than the
continuous knock-out barrier price 𝐻𝑐 and on the observation day 𝑡𝑖 the stock’s closing
price 𝑆𝑖 is greater than or equal to the accumulation strike price 𝑋, then the consumer buys
the fixing quantity 𝑞. The third payoff is two times the difference between the stock price
on the settlement day 𝑆𝑇𝑖 and the accumulation strike price 𝑋. It follows that the stock price
for all trading hours 𝑆𝜏 is strictly less than the continuous knock-out barrier price 𝐻𝑐 and
on the observation day 𝑡𝑖 the stock’s closing price 𝑆𝑖 is strictly less than the accumulation
strike price 𝑋, then the consumer buys twice the fixing quantity 2𝑞 (Lam et al., 2009).
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Combining one long up-and-out call on a forward contract and two short up-andout puts on a forward contract creates the portfolio known as the zero-cost accumulator
contract with delayed settlement. Lam et al. (2009) provide the portfolio definition for the
zero-cost accumulator with delayed settlement and continuous knock-out barrier
monitoring as defined in Equation 4,
𝐹 (𝑋,
𝐹
(4) 𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1{𝐶𝑢𝑜
𝐻𝑐 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 ) − 2 ∙ 𝑃𝑢𝑜
(𝑋, 𝐻𝑐 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 )}

where 𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 is the value of the zero-cost accumulator contract portfolio under delayed
𝐹
settlement, 𝑃𝑢𝑜
(𝑋, 𝐻𝑐 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 ) is the up-and-out put price on a forward contract,
𝐹
𝐶𝑢𝑜
(𝑋, 𝐻𝑐 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 ) is the up-and-out call price on a forward contract, 𝑋 is the accumulation

strike price, 𝐻𝑐 is the knock-out barrier price with continuous monitoring, 𝑡𝑖 is the
observation day, and 𝑇𝑖 is the maturity date of the forward contract (Lam et al., 2009).
Across the globe, accumulator contracts are offered in unique over-the-counter
formats in multiple asset classes. An example of the equity consumer accumulator is the
KODA ELI (Knock-out Discount Accumulative Equity Linked Instrument) offered by the
global investment company Macquarie (Lam et al., 2009). Accumulators in equities
conventionally consist of a year of one long daily up-and-out call option and a year of two
short daily up-and-out put options with the same accumulation strike price and knock-out
barrier price. Cheng (2010) modeled an equity accumulator similar to a product issued by
Rabobank (Cheng, 2010). Wystup (2007) discussed European incorporation of
accumulator contracts in foreign currency markets for corporate investment (Wystup,
2007). Credit Suisse’s FX accumulator and Caylon’s accumulated forward boost contract
are two such examples of the accumulator contract in European currency markets (Lam et
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al., 2009). Cheng (2010) produced an FX-linked accumulator integrating a suspension
feature like ABN AMRO Bank (Cheng, 2010).
Consumer accumulators generally fix 0x the quantity above the knock-out barrier,
fix 1x the quantity below the knock-out barrier price and above the accumulation strike
price, and fix 2x the quantity below the accumulation strike price. Hence, the consumer
accumulator maintains a gearing ratio of 0x, 1x, and 2x. However, less mainstream
accumulators may sustain a gearing ratio different than the normal 0x, 1x, and 2x structure.
In unique cases, the fixing quantity of 1x remains the same as normal between the barriers,
but below the accumulation strike price, the gearing ratio 𝑔x may be greater or less than
the common 2x structure (Lam et al., 2009). Based on the INTL FCStone producer
accumulator indications, the producer accumulator bears the standard gearing ratio. It fixes
2x the quantity above the accumulation strike, 1x the quantity below the accumulation
strike price and above the knock-out barrier price, and 0x the quantity below the knock-out
barrier price.
Dependent on factors such as implied volatility, risk-free interest rate, maturity, and
referenced asset price, consumer accumulator accumulation strike prices and knock-out
barrier prices range in spatial distance from the underlying asset’s price at origination.
Discount percentage specifies the spatial distance the accumulation strike price is placed
below the underlying asset’s price at origination. A lower discount percentage means a
lower rebate on the accumulation of the referenced asset, a higher discount percentage
gives investors a larger rebate on the accrual of the underlying. Knock-out percentage
indicates the spatial distance the knock-out barrier is located above the underlying asset’s
price at origination. Higher knock-out percentage allows for greater price volatility without
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the occurrence of knock-out; lower knock-out percentage permits less price volatility
before knock-out transpires. Alterations of these two metrics significantly affects the
profitability and risk associated with the consumer accumulator (Kwong, Fok, Kwong, and
Fok, 2012).
Kwong et al. (2012) compared consumer accumulators with differing knock-out
percentages (2-7%) and discount percentages (4-15%). Concluding findings show higher
knock-out percentages combined with higher discount percentages yield the greatest
cumulative profits. When a high knock-out percentage is united with a low discount
percentage, significant cumulative loss occurs (Kwong et al., 2012). Example accumulator
contracts in Cheng (2010) assigned a knock-out percentage of 110% and a discount
percentage of 94.3% for the equity accumulator simulated. The FX accumulator with the
suspension feature simulated, under the Heston framework, assumes a discounted strike at
87.5% and suspension barrier at 105%. Under the Black-Scholes model, a discounted
accumulation strike at 95% and suspension feature of 114% is adopted for simulation. The
consumer accumulator simulated in the commodity market assumes a knock-out feature at
106% and double commitment strike set at 95% (Cheng, 2010). Producer accumulator
contracts, revealed by INTL FCStone indications, set accumulation strike prices ranging
from 100.07% to 107.60% the referenced futures price in corn and 101.76% to 107.84%
the referenced futures price in soybeans. Knock-out barrier price ranges from 85.38% to
94.67% the referenced futures price in corn and 90.74% to 105.57% the referenced futures
price in soybeans.
Contingent on contract structure and asset class, accumulator asset settlement can
be either immediate or delayed. For immediate settlement, the observation day and delivery
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day are the same day, so assets are fixed and delivered to the investor on the observation
day. Under delayed settlement, the observation and delivery day are not the same day.
Quantity and price are determined on the observation date, but the investor takes future
delivery via forward contracts on the referenced underlying asset. Fixed quantity is
reconciled periodically for consumer accumulators, commonly weekly or monthly. Lam et
al. (2009) stated that in practice, delayed settlement is more routine than immediate
settlement (Lam et al., 2009). INTL FCStone producer accumulator contracts assume
delayed settlement as corn and soybean bushels are delivered or reconciled at accumulator
contract expiration.
Knock-out barrier options possess a continuously or discretely monitored barrier.
Continuously and discretely monitored barriers differ based on price observation of the
underlying asset. Discrete price observation takes place at a certain point in time; knockout occurs if the knock-out barrier price is breached at the end of the observation day.
Accumulators with continuous barriers maintain continuous price monitoring of the
underlying asset at all market hours. Knock-out occurs if the underlying’s price crosses the
knock-out barrier during any market trading hours (Lam et al., 2009). In the market, most
barrier options contain a discretely monitored barrier. If the barrier is continuously
monitored, illiquid markets may present arbitrage opportunity since markets around the
world support inconsistent trading hours (Kou, 2003). Lam et al. (2009) developed
theoretical models for discrete and continuous consumer accumulators. For the producer
accumulator, the referenced futures price is monitored at all CBOT trading hours, not all
market hours; therefore, INTL FCStone producer accumulator contracts contain a knockout barrier that is monitored in discrete time.
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Lam et al. (2009) investigated the zero-cost structure consumer accumulator
designed for two barrier structures, continuous and discrete, to define risk traits, payoffs,
and theoretical pricing models under immediate and delayed settlement. Applying the same
pricing methodology of the continuous barrier accumulator to the discrete barrier
accumulator results in significant valuation error. Consequently, for the discrete barrier
accumulator, a modification of the continuous barrier by a correction term is used. The
substitution of the corrected discrete barrier for the continuous barrier establishes an
approximate valuation model to value the discrete barrier accumulator under immediate
and delayed settlement. Each accumulator portfolio, under both barrier structures and
settlement types, is established by combining daily up-and-out call and put options valued
using the Black-Scholes model for the continuous barrier accumulator and Monte Carlo
simulation for the discrete barrier accumulator. Developing a sample discrete accumulator
for each settlement and testing it using Monte Carlo simulation indicates that the discrete
barrier approximation is efficient and consistent with the continuous accumulator for each
settlement type (Lam et al., 2009).
Lam et al. (2009) computed an asymmetrical profit and loss distribution with an
extended left tail and short right tail for the consumer accumulator. The asymmetric profit
and loss distribution conveys the potential of vast downside loss and limited upside profit.
Findings quantitively display higher risk for the buyer than the seller. High Vega and Delta
values arise when the investor is losing compared to winning, exhibiting that losing
investors have a superior susceptibility to volatility and directional price changes.
Concluding findings convey that regardless of the market, accumulator contracts exhibit
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strong asymmetrical risk; therefore, large profits are unlikely and high loss is probable
(Lam et al., 2009).
Kwong et al. (2012) studied accumulator profit and loss probability through Monte
Carol simulation using HSBC data for 2006 and 2007. To judge the fairness of the
accumulator, average and cumulative profit or loss and standard deviation are calculated.
Findings show early knock-out to be the deterministic factor for positive or negative profit.
In each case, when the contract knocked-out early, profit ended positive. When the
accumulator continued through contract expiry, profit was continually negative. Market
trend is found to severely affect accumulator profitability. Results confirm that the
accumulator offers a reasonable investment for investors in a neutral or upward trend. Yet,
when market trend is downward, accumulator contracts become substantially more
dangerous. Naturally, heightened volatility leads to a higher probability of knock-out and
purchase of double the daily fixing quantity of shares. Concluding results show that
accumulator contracts are an unfair investment for buyers due to their limited upside profit
potential and unlimited downside loss potential (Kwong et al., 2012).
Cheng (2010) reviewed pricing and simulation under the Black-Scholes and Heston
frameworks for three structurally unique accumulators: suspension feature, knock-out
feature, and double-commitment with knock-out feature. Accumulating GBP/USD, the
FX-linked accumulator with suspension feature attains a positive simulated contract price
and positively skewed payoffs. The equity accumulator with knock-out feature, accrues
HSBC shares, has a negative contract price under simulation and Black-Scholes, but a
positive simulated contract price under the Heston framework. Payoffs are unbalanced and
skewed toward negative profit, average duration is 91 trading days, and knock-out

29
probability is 77%. Accumulating December corn, the consumer accumulator with knockout and double commitment features has a negative simulated contract price and negatively
skewed payoffs, average duration of 15 weeks, and a 70% knock-out probability.
Concluding findings demonstrate that volatility is the most powerful parameter in
accumulator pricing. When volatility is low, simulated accumulator prices are slightly
positive; however, when volatility is high, simulated accumulator prices are heavily
negative. The Heston model is found to produce inconsistent results with simulation and
the Black-Scholes model illustrating that the Heston framework inefficiently prices
accumulator contracts (Cheng, 2010).
Research by Lam et al. (2009), Kwong et al. (2012), and Cheng (2010) deemed the
consumer accumulator to be an unfair and risky investment strategy due to simulation
results confirming large negative asymmetric risk. Consumer and producer accumulators
differ as consumer accumulators cap upside profit and leave unlimited downside risk, while
producer accumulators leave unlimited upside profit and cap downside risk. Due to this
difference in mechanics, our research plans to dispel the notion that the producer
accumulator suffers from the same negative asymmetric risk as the consumer accumulator.
With confirmation by our results, our objective is to verify that the producer accumulator
is a favorable risk management tool for corn and soybean producers to employ. Our
research adds to accumulator contract literature and pricing theory by identifying a
theoretical pricing model and quantifying simulation performance of the producer
accumulator in corn and soybean commodity markets.
CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data Description
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To examine the performance of the producer accumulator contract, we priced
synthetic producer accumulator portfolio contracts and do back-testing using secondary
corn and soybean futures contract data, producer accumulator contract corn and soybean
indication data, and interest rate data. The price and volatility data was obtained from
Bloomberg. The price series and volatility data used was daily last price, daily low price,
and daily 100% at-the-money implied volatility for the corn futures contract months of
March (H), July (N), and December (Z) from 1/18/2008-4/7/2017, and for the soybean
futures contract months of March (H), July (N), and November (X) from 1/18/20084/10/2017. We used annual 1-year U.S. Treasury bill data from the beginning of the year,
including annual rate and date, ranging from 1/1/2008-1/2/2017 to provide a benchmark
risk-free rate of return.
Actual producer accumulator contract offerings from INTL FCStone were obtained
for a limited period. Producer accumulator contract indication data of valuation date, daily
futures price, contract month, daily start date, daily end date, accumulator contract
duration, accumulation strike price, and knock-out barrier price for the corn contract
months of March (H), July (N), December (Z) were from 9/6/2016-2/28/2017 and for the
soybean contract months of March (H), July (N), November (N) were from 9/6/20162/28/2017.
3.2 Zero-Cost Producer Accumulator Model and Payoffs
Zero-cost producer accumulator contracts are structured by combining three barrier
options into a portfolio. Specifically, the portfolio consists of one long down-and-out put
option on a forward contract and two short down-and-out call options on a forward
contract. All three barrier options maintain the same accumulation strike price, knock-out
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barrier price, settlement day, discrete barrier monitoring, and expiration day.
Consequently, to obtain accumulation strike prices for the synthetic producer accumulator
contracts, we theoretically price the portfolio of all three down-and-out options and find
where the three options provide offsetting amounts of premiums received and premiums
paid. The strike price, barrier price, barrier monitoring, and settlement date that satisfies
the offsetting condition we define as the zero-cost accumulator that could theoretically be
offered without assuming risk.
In practice, producers integrating a producer accumulator contract into their
marketing strategy deliver physical corn or soybeans sold after contract expiry. Because of
this, we price our down-and-out barrier options assuming delayed settlement. In over-thecounter markets, barrier options are generally assumed to maintain a discretely monitored
knock-out barrier. In addition, producer accumulator contracts knock-out if the knock-out
barrier is crossed during CBOT market trading hours. Since underlying price is not
monitored on a continuous basis, we assume a discretely monitored barrier. We follow the
assumptions of the binomial model as the synthetic producer accumulator contracts we
back-test are constructed from barrier options priced using the binomial model. These
assumptions include: no transaction costs, no taxes, no margin requirements, no arbitrage,
the investor is risk neutral, binomial distribution of returns, constant interest rate for the
option’s lifetime, investors may borrow as much capital as they need at the risk-free rate,
short selling is permitted, and volatility is constant (Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein, 1979).
We adapt the framework of Lam et al. (2009) to construct the synthetic producer
accumulator portfolio and quantify the spatial payoffs. The value of the zero-cost producer
accumulator with delayed settlement and discrete barrier monitoring is determined from a
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portfolio of two short down-and-out call options on a forward contract and one long downand-out put option on a forward contract is defined in Equation 5,
𝐹 (𝑋,
𝐹
(5) 𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1{𝑃𝑑𝑜
𝐻𝑑 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 ) − 2 ∙ 𝐶𝑑𝑜
(𝑋, 𝐻𝑑 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 )

where 𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 is the value of the zero-cost producer accumulator portfolio under delayed
𝐹 (𝑋,
settlement, 𝑃𝑑𝑜
𝐻𝑑 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 ) is the down-and-out put price on a forward contract,
𝐹 (𝑋,
𝐶𝑑𝑜
𝐻𝑑 , 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 ) is the down-and-out call price on a forward contract, 𝑋 is the

accumulation strike price, 𝐻𝑑 is the discretely monitored knock-out barrier price, 𝑇𝑖 is the
forward contract maturity date, and 𝑡𝑖 is the observation date.
Producer accumulator contracts require that during the contract’s lifetime 𝑡, the
producer sells a weekly fixed quantity 𝑞 of the underlying futures commodity 𝐹 at the
accumulation strike price 𝑋 on the defined weekly observation day 𝑡𝑖 , delivered on the
settlement date 𝑇𝑖 , contingent on the knock-out barrier 𝐻𝑑 . Observation days cannot be the
same day 𝑡1 < 𝑡2 < ⋯ < 𝑡𝑛 , but delayed settlement days may be the same day 𝑇1 ≤ 𝑇2 ≤
⋯ ≤ 𝑇𝑛 . Producer accumulator contracts generally support a zero-cost structure,
demanding no initial premium payment by the contract holder to establish the contract. To
formalize our producer accumulator payoffs under delayed settlement and discrete barrier
monitoring, we adapt the spatial payoff methodology of Lam et al. (2009). Spatial payoffs
for the producer accumulator under delayed settlement and discrete barrier monitoring are
defined as,
(6) 0

𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏≤𝑡𝑖 𝐹𝜏 ≤ 𝐻𝑑

(7) 𝑋 – 𝐹𝑇𝑖

𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏≤𝑡𝑖 𝐹𝜏 > 𝐻𝑑 , 𝐹𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑋

(8) 2(𝑋 – 𝐹𝑇𝑖 )

𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏≤𝑡𝑖 𝐹𝜏 > 𝐻𝑑 , 𝐹𝑡𝑖 > 𝑋
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where 𝐹𝑡𝑖 is the futures contract price on the observation day, 𝐹𝜏 is the futures contract price
for all CBOT futures contract trading hours, 𝐹𝑇𝑖 is the futures contract price on the
settlement day, 𝑋 is the accumulation strike price, 𝐻𝑑 is the knock-out barrier price with
discrete monitoring, 𝑡𝑖 is the observation day, 𝜏 is all trading hours, and 𝑇𝑖 is the maturity
date of the forward contract.
The first payoff is zero. It follows that if the underlying futures contract price for
all CBOT futures contract trading hours 𝐹𝜏 breaches the knock-out barrier price 𝐻𝑑 , knockout prompts conclusion of the contract permanently, fixing no current weekly sales, yet
former weekly sales 𝑞𝑖 remain. The second payoff is the difference between the
accumulation strike price 𝑋 and the futures contract price on the settlement day 𝐹𝑇𝑖 . It
follows that if the underlying futures contract price for all CBOT futures contract trading
hours 𝐹𝜏 is strictly greater than the knock-out barrier price 𝐻𝑑 and the futures weekly
closing price on the observation day 𝐹𝑡𝑖 is less than or equal to the accumulation strike
price 𝑋, then the producer sells the weekly fixing quantity 𝑞. The third payoff is two times
the difference between the accumulation strike price 𝑋 and the futures contract price on the
settlement day 𝐹𝑇𝑖 . It follows that if the underlying futures contract price for all CBOT
futures contract trading hours 𝐹𝜏 is strictly greater than the knock-out barrier price 𝐻𝑑 and
the futures weekly closing price on the observation day 𝐹𝑡𝑖 is strictly greater than the
accumulation strike price 𝑋, then the producer sells twice the weekly fixing quantity 2𝑞.
3.3 Synthetic Producer Accumulator Contracts
To determine our theoretical pricing method to model actual producer accumulator
contracts offered in practice, we collected a limited set of producer accumulator contract
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indication data from 9/6/2016-2/28/2017 offered by INTL FCStone. To expand our set of
accumulator contracts for performance back-testing, we constructed synthetic producer
accumulator contracts and price them using option pricing models and linear regression
models that best fit the specifications that were used by INTL FCStone. In total, we
constructed 5,150 synthetic producer accumulator contracts referencing the monthly corn
futures contracts of March (H), July (N), and December (Z) as underlying from 1/18/20082/23/2017. To simulate the producer accumulator in the soybean market, we constructed
5,166 synthetic producer accumulator contracts ranging from 1/18/2008-2/23/2017
referencing the soybean futures contract months of March (H), July (N), and November
(X) as underlying.
Producer accumulator contract terms include: futures price, accumulation strike
price, knock-out barrier price, and contract end date that is aligned with the referenced
futures contract month. Violation of the accumulation strike price or knock-out barrier
price is contingent on the price-time path of the referenced futures contract. Synthetic
producer accumulator contracts follow the bushel pricing and payoff criteria outlined in
the zero-cost accumulation strike models section. We use a multiple linear regression to
determine a knock-out barrier price for our synthetic contracts. Determination of the knockout barrier price for our synthetic contracts is discussed further in the knock-out barrier
estimation section. Based on the contract’s terms, zero-cost accumulation strike price for
each synthetic contract is estimated by the three-alternative barrier option pricing models
discussed in the zero-cost producer accumulation strike models section. To estimate the
strike prices and find the zero-cost contract we used MATLAB’s Financial package. The
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end date we used for all synthetic producer accumulator contracts was the expiration date
of the underlying futures contract.
Our synthetic producer accumulator contracts range in duration from 20 to 60
weeks. Synthetic contracts are executed every week between 20 and 60 weeks allowing us
to capture the performance of contracts with different durations. Coinciding with duration,
each contract start date or execution date occurs on a weekly basis between 20-60 weeks
from the expiration of the referenced futures contract. Regardless of duration and start date,
each synthetic contract is designed to sell 5,000 bushels over the contract’s life. Because
of the producer accumulator’s double accumulation and knock-out characteristics,
potential bushels accumulated can range from 0-10,000 bushels despite the contract
origination offering of 5,000 bushels. There is no guarantee level of the bushels
accumulated by the producer accumulator contract. In a situation where contract knockout occurs prior to pricing the contracted 5,000 bushels, or no double up occurs freeing up
bushels that remain unpriced to cover up a potential double up scenario, are priced at the
underlying futures price at the end of the contract period. Table 2 and Table 3 provide
examples of corn and soybean producer accumulator contracts that were back-tested. An
example of actual INTL FCStone contract terms is presented in A1 of the appendix.
Table 2. Synthetic Producer Accumulator Contract Terms in Corn
Issuer
Accumulator Type
Futures Contract
Futures Price
Start Date
End Date
Periods
Accumulation Strike

FCStone International
Producer Accumulator
CZ7
373
9/16/2016
11/24/2017
63 Weeks
398
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Knock-Out Barrier
335
Guaranteed Level
N/A
Each week that the referenced futures contract price settles at or below the
accumulation strike, 100% of the weekly quantity is priced at the accumulation strike.
Each week that the referenced futures contract price settles above the accumulation
strike, 200% of the weekly quantity is priced at the accumulation strike.
If on any date between start date and end date, during the non-electronic or electronic
daily session, the referenced futures contract ever trades or settles at or below the
knock-out barrier, accumulation ceases. Any bushels already accumulated in prior
weeks will continue to be priced at the accumulation strike.
Table 3. Synthetic Producer Accumulator Contract Terms in Soybeans
Issuer
Accumulator Type
Futures Contract
Futures Price

FCStone International
Producer Accumulator
SX7
1008

Start Date
11/25/2016
End Date
11/24/2017
Periods
53 Weeks
Accumulation Strike
1087
Knock-Out Barrier
980
Guaranteed Level
N/A
Each week that the referenced futures contract price settles at or below the
accumulation strike, 100% of the weekly quantity is priced at the accumulation strike.
Each week that the referenced futures contract price settles above the accumulation
strike, 200% of the weekly quantity is priced at the accumulation strike.
If on any date between start date and end date, during the non-electronic or electronic
daily session, the referenced futures contract ever trades or settles at or below the
knock-out barrier, accumulation ceases. Any bushels already accumulated in prior
weeks will continue to be priced at the accumulation strike.
3.4 Knock-Out Barrier Estimation
To determine the knock-out barrier price of our synthetic producer accumulator
contracts, we use the observed set of accumulator contracts offered by INTL FCStone and
a multiple linear regression to estimate a model to predict barrier placement. Because the
knock-out barrier price is a function of the underlying futures price and time to expiration,
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the futures price of the referenced futures contract and the number of trading days until
contract expiration were used as independent variables. To estimate the coefficients for the
independent variables in the knock-out barrier price equation, we use 176 INTL FCStone
producer accumulator contract observations in corn and 195 INTL FCStone producer
accumulator contract observations in soybeans. Observation data consisting of the knockout barrier price, futures price, and the number of trading days until contract expiration is
based off the referenced futures contracts CH7, CN7, CZ7, CH8 for corn and SH7, SN7,
SX7, SH8 for soybeans during 9/6/2016-2/28/2017.
Regressing the INTL FCStone observed value for futures price and number of
trading days until contract expiration on the observed INTL FCStone knock-out barrier
prices, we identify the model parameters for the knock-out barrier price equation. The
intercept alpha value is zero in equation 9. Including an intercept value decreases the
accuracy of the knock-out barrier price equation. To calculate the knock-out barrier price
value for each synthetic producer accumulator contract, we identify the knock-out barrier
price equation as seen in Equation 9 as,
(9) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 𝑥𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖
where 𝑦𝑖 is the knock-out barrier price value for the synthetic producer accumulator
contract, 𝛽𝑖 is the futures price beta coefficient from the multiple linear regression defined
by the observed data, 𝑥𝑖 is the futures price of the referenced futures contract month, 𝛽𝑗 is
the number of trading days until contract expiration beta coefficient from the multiple
linear regression defined by the observed data, 𝑥𝑗 is the number of trading days until
contract expiration, and 𝑒𝑖 is the residual.
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Verifying the accuracy of our predicted knock-out barrier price values from the
knock-out barrier price equation, we run a simple linear regression to review how precisely
the predicted knock-out barrier price values fit the observed knock-out barrier price values.
The simple linear regression equation is shown in Equation 10,
(10) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥̂𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖
where 𝑦𝑖 is the INTL FCStone observed knock-out barrier price value, 𝛼 is the intercept
value, 𝛽 is the correlation coefficient, 𝑥̂𝑖 is the predicted knock-out barrier price value from
the knock-out barrier price equation, and 𝑒𝑖 is the residual.
3.5 Zero-Cost Accumulation Strike Models
Once we established our contract valuation date, expiration date, underlying futures
contract, and knock-out barrier price, we used the theoretical framework of the Cox-RossRubinstein (CRR) binomial tree model, Longstaff-Schwartz (LS) method, and the finite
difference (FD) explicit approximation method to estimate accumulation strike prices for
our synthetic producer accumulator contracts and to validate the best model to estimate
accumulation strike prices given our observed contract specifications offered by INTL
FCStone. Using the MATLAB Financial package, our synthetic accumulator contract
accumulation strike prices were determined where there was zero-cost to the contracting
party. Specifically, this occurs when the premium needed to purchase the in-the-money
down-and-out put is offset by selling two out-of-the-money down-and-out calls. To
validate the accuracy of each model’s estimated accumulation strike prices, we compared
each model’s zero-cost accumulation strike price to the accumulation strike prices offered
by INTL FCStone using the observed producer accumulator contract data. The option
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pricing formula that best fit the INTL FCStone data was selected to further price the
synthetic producer accumulator contract portfolios to conduct performance back-testing.
3.5.1 Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) Binomial Tree Model
Cox, Ross and Rubenstein (1979) proposed the binomial options pricing model
(BOPM) to value American and European options in discrete time. The CRR binomial
model assumes that there only two potential prices for the underlying asset 𝑆 at the end of
each time interval 𝑡 + 1, either an up price 𝑆𝑢 with probability 𝑝 or a down price 𝑆𝑑 with
probability 1 − 𝑝 (Cox et al., 1979).
The CRR binomial tree consists of nodes at each time interval between option
valuation and expiration. Each node represents a potential future price of the underlying
asset at a specific point in time. Options are valued through the numerical method in a
three-step process for American options. The binomial price tree is established by working
forward, calculating the underlying asset’s price at each node from the valuation date to
expiration date. Underlying price can either branch up or down by a fixed value at each
node, which is calculated based on volatility 𝜎 and time 𝑡, following the random walk
theory. Node positions for the binomial tree are established by the equations,
(11) 𝑆𝑢 = 𝑆𝑢
(12) 𝑆𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑
(13) 𝑢 = 𝑒 𝜎√𝛿𝑡
(14) 𝑑 = 𝑒 −𝜎√𝛿𝑡
(15) 𝑝 =

𝑒 𝑅𝛿𝑡 −𝑑
𝑢−𝑑

where 𝑅 is the risk-free rate of return and 𝛿𝑡 is the time interval between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1.
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At the option’s expiration, intrinsic values are calculated at each final node. For a
call option, the option value at the final node is defined in Equation 16 as,
(16) 𝑉𝑛 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝑆𝑛 − 𝑋), 0]
and for a put option, the option value at the final node is defined in Equation 17,
(17) 𝑉𝑛 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[𝑋 − (𝑆𝑛 ), 0]
where 𝑉𝑛 is the value of the node at expiration, 𝑆𝑛 is the price of the underlying asset and
𝑋 is the option’s strike price.
The option’s theoretical value is calculated by backward induction or discounting
the option’s payoffs backward from expiration to the valuation date. Through backward
induction, a value is consecutively calculated at each node in the tree by the following for
an American-style call option that is expressed in Equation 18 as,
(18) 𝑉𝑛 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝑆𝑛 − 𝑋𝑒 −𝑅𝛿𝑡 (𝑝𝑉𝑢 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑉𝑑 )]
and an American-style put option as shown in Equation 19,
(19) 𝑉𝑛 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝑋 − 𝑆𝑛 𝑒 −𝑅𝛿𝑡 (𝑝𝑉𝑢 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑉𝑑 )]
where 𝑉𝑢 is the value of the option from an upper node in the next time period 𝑡 + 1 and
𝑉𝑑 is the value of the option from the lower node in the next time period 𝑡 + 1.
Discounted payoff value and early exercise value or intrinsic value are calculated
at each node between the expiration date and the valuation date. Due to the no arbitrage
rule, the greater of the discounted payoff value or early exercise value is taken for the
option’s value at each node. European options have a similar process, although they only
consider the discounted payoff value at each node and not the early exercise value. This
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difference in valuation process ensues since early exercise is a feature of American options,
not European options (Cox et al., 1979).
3.5.2 Longstaff-Schwartz (LS) Model
The Longstaff-Schwartz (LS) model values options using simulation to define the
optimal exercise strategy by comparing the intrinsic and conditional expectation values at
each exercise point to approximate a discounted cash flow matrix. Simulation functions as
a comparative alternate to the valuation methods of binomial trees and finite difference.
Derivatives with an American exercise style and a path-dependent nature can benefit from
valuation by simulation. Since American options allow their owner to exercise them at any
time from valuation to expiration, there are countless exercise possibilities. At any point in
time, the owner of an American option contrasts the payoff associated with immediate
exercise and the payoff associated with delayed exercise or the expected payoff from
continuation (Longstaff and Schwartz, 2001).
The ideal exercise strategy requires determining if the payoff is greater from either
immediate exercise or delayed exercise via the value of the expected payoff from
continuation. Immediate exercise value is derived from the intrinsic value of the option.
Because the option holder can choose between the two exercise times, with the option’s
intrinsic value known, the decision relies on the approximation of the continuous value.
The delayed exercise value is found by calculating the conditional expectation through
Monte Carlo simulation by means of OLS regression (Longstaff and Schwartz, 2001).
Final expected payoffs from continuation are regressed on state variables to find
the fitted value. The regression’s fitted value provides an estimated conditional expectation
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value for each exercise time on each path. Optimal exercise strategy or stopping rule at
each in-the-money path is estimated by simulating the conditional expectation at all
exercise times and comparing it to the immediate exercise value, then choosing the higher
of the two. This process is repeated reiteratively to define the option cash flow matrix.
Discounting the values in the option cash flow matrix back for all paths allows for the
American option to be valued at time zero (Longstaff and Schwartz, 2001).
The Longstaff-Schwartz methodology assumes a probability space (Ω, 𝐹, 𝑃) and a
finite timeframe [0, 𝑇]. State space Ω is the possibility of outcomes between 0 and T where
the sample path 𝜔 represents an individual outcome, 𝐹 is the sigma information set of
filtration actions at time 𝑇 and 𝑃 denotes the probability measure on the factors of 𝐹.
𝐶(𝜔, 𝑠 ; 𝑡, 𝑇) is the path of the option’s cash flows with the stipulation that the option is
only exercised later than 𝑡 and the option owner adopts the optimal stopping strategy at
every point in time later than 𝑡. The holder of the American option considers the optimal
stopping policy and can only exercise on restricted dates 0 < 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡3 … < 𝑡𝐾 = 𝑇. If
the option owner immediately exercises the option when the immediate exercise value is
equivalent or larger than the continuation value, option value is maximized. Considering
the no-arbitrage environment, the value of continuation is required to be equivalent to the
risk-neutral expectation of discounted future cash flows 𝐶(𝜔, 𝑠 ; 𝑡𝑘 , 𝑇). The continuation
value 𝐹(𝜔; 𝑡𝑘 ) is defined in Equation 20,
𝑡

𝑗
(20) 𝐹(𝜔; 𝑡𝑘 ) = 𝐸𝑄 [∑𝐾
𝑗=𝑘+1 exp(− ∫𝑡 𝑅(𝜔, 𝑠)𝑑𝑠) 𝐶(𝜔, 𝑡𝑗 ; 𝑡𝑘 , 𝑇) 𝑙 𝐹𝑡𝑘 ]
𝑘

where 𝑅(𝜔, 𝑡) is the risk-free discount rate and (𝐹𝑡𝑘 ) is the information set at time 𝑡𝑘 . At
each possible exercise date, the algorithm uses ordinary least squares regression to estimate

43
the conditional expectation value. Comparing the conditional expectation value to the
immediate exercise value, optimal exercise occurs when the immediate value is greater
than or equal to the conditional expectation value. From the valuation date to the final
exercise date, the procedure is repeated at each exercise time (Longstaff and Schwartz,
2001).
3.5.3 Finite Difference (FD) Explicit Approximation Model
The finite difference method uses discrete difference equations to approximate the
continuous differential equations that reveal how the options price changes across time. It
can adapt to valuing a wide variety of options, including exotic American derivatives such
as barrier options. Black and Scholes (1973) established the analytical solution for the
valuation of European put and call options. When an analytical solution is not a plausible
method, the finite difference method can be implemented to estimate solutions for option
values that are accurate measures across tiny discrete time changes. Option price at time 𝑡
is linked to three different prices at time 𝑡 + ∆𝑡 in the explicit version of the finite
difference method (Hull and White, 1990).
Pricing options with the finite difference method requires a grid of potential future
prices of the underlying asset. A price grid is established by taking the time between the
valuation date and expiration and dividing it into 𝑇 equivalent time periods and dividing
the underlying asset’s price range into 𝑁 equivalent intervals. This creates a grid with 𝑁 +
1 price intervals and 𝑇 + 1 time periods. Notably, the price grid chosen should have the
underlying asset’s initial price at the middle of the 𝑁 equivalent price intervals (Hull and
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White, 1990). The size of the grid in MATLAB is set at 400 price intervals and 100 time
intervals.
Boundary conditions are defined for the anticipated price range of the unknown
value 𝑓(𝑡, 𝑆). Identification of boundary conditions is important as they establish minimum
and maximum values for 𝑆, along with outlining the expected payoff of the option at
expiration. Boundary conditions are used to calculate the payoff at each boundary point on
the grid. With the option’s value at the boundary conditions calculated, values for the
interior points on the grid can be calculated through backward induction at all grid locations
(Hull and White, 1990).
The differential equation is satisfied by a riskless portfolio that consists of an asset
whose value is represented by 𝑆 and an option whose value is represented by 𝑓(𝑡, 𝑆). The
partial differential equation contains partial derivatives with respect to time 𝑡 and the
underlying asset’s value 𝑆.
The explicit finite difference method uses the Black-Scholes-Merton partial
differential equation and is assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion. The BlackScholes-Merton partial differential equation is defined as Equation 21,
(21)

𝜕𝑓

𝜕𝑓

1 𝜕2 𝑓

+ 𝑅 𝜕𝑆 𝑆 + 2 𝜕𝑆2 𝜎 2 𝑆 2 = 𝑅𝑓
𝜕𝑡

where 𝑅 is the risk-free interest rate, 𝜎 is volatility, and 𝑓 is the value of the option
derivative.
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For explicit finite difference approximation, the Black-Scholes-Merton partial
differential equation is discretized by the backward approximation method through forward
𝜕𝑓

difference to find

(22)

𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑡

=

𝜕𝑡

. We get Equation 22 defined as,

𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖 −𝑓𝑗,𝑖
𝛿𝑡

where 𝑓𝑗,𝑖 is the node price of the derivative on the grid at the price level 𝑖 and 𝑗 denotes
the grid time step.
𝜕𝑓

Delta 𝜕𝑆 is estimated by central differences as seen in Equation 23 as,
𝜕𝑓

(23) 𝜕𝑆 =

𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖+1 −𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖−1
2𝛿𝑆
𝜕2 𝑓

Gamma 𝜕𝑆2 is estimated by central differences shown in Equation 24 as,
𝜕2 𝑓

(24) 𝜕𝑆2 =

𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖+1 +𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖−1 −2𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖
𝛿𝑆 2

All three approximations are substituted into the Black-Scholes-Merton partial
differential equation to define Equation 25,
(25)

𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖 −𝑓𝑗,𝑖
𝛿𝑡

+𝑟

𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖+1 −𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖−1
2𝛿𝑆

1 𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖+1 +𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖−1 −2𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖

𝑆+2

𝛿𝑆 2

which simplifies to Equation 26,
(26) 𝑓𝑗,𝑖 =

1
1+𝑅𝛿𝑡

(𝑝𝑢 𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖+1 + 𝑝𝑚 𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖 + 𝑝𝑑 𝑓𝑗+1,𝑖−1 )

Explicit finite difference parameters are defined as,
1

(27) 𝑝𝑢 = 2 (𝜎 2 𝑖 2 + 𝑅𝑖)𝛿𝑡
(28) 𝑝𝑚 = 1 − (𝜎 2 𝑖 2 )𝛿𝑡

𝜎 2 𝑆 2 = 𝑅𝑓𝑗,𝑖
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1

(29) 𝑝𝑑 = 2 (𝜎 2 𝑖 2 − 𝑅𝑖)𝛿𝑡
Backward induction uses the options payoff at expiration to calculate the prior grid
node values back to the valuation date to obtain the option’s price at valuation (Haug,
2007).
3.6 Zero-Cost Accumulation Strike Model Validation Methods
To identify the best valuation model for pricing the zero-cost accumulation strike
prices for our synthetic producer accumulator contracts, we focus on the accumulation
strike price prediction accuracy and residual minimization ability of each barrier option
pricing model. Contrasting the valuation capability of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial
model, Longstaff-Schwartz method, and finite difference method, we employ three
efficiency tests. Measuring prediction accuracy, we test the fit of each models predicted
zero-cost accumulation strike price to the observed zero-cost accumulation strike price
values from INTL FCStone. A root-mean-square error (RMSE) test and a mean absolute
error (MAE) test quantify the residual minimization proficiency of each framework.
Testing the accuracy of the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike prices generated
under each model, we run a simple linear regression to evaluate how well the predicted
zero-cost accumulation strike price values fit the observed zero-cost accumulation strike
price values. The simple linear regression equation is shown in Equation 30 as,
(30) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥̂𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖
where 𝑦𝑖 is the INTL FCStone observed zero-cost accumulation strike price, 𝛼 is the
intercept value, 𝛽 is the correlation coefficient, 𝑥̂𝑖 is the predicted zero-cost accumulation
strike price from the barrier option pricing model, and 𝑒𝑖 is the residual.
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Root-mean-square error (RMSE) or root-mean-square deviation (RMSD) is
implemented to measure the difference between observed values and values predicted by
a model. By measuring the difference between observed and predicted values, the residuals
identified represent the sample standard deviation. Taking the square root of the average
squared errors gives a higher weighting to large errors and a lower weighting to small
errors, thus testing error consistency. Comparing the root-mean-square values among
models quantifies prediction accuracy. The model with the lowest root-mean-square error
unit value has the best prediction accuracy since the predicted values fit the data efficiently,
while the model with the highest root-mean-square error unit value has the worst
predication accuracy as the predicted values don’t fit the data proficiently. Root-meansquare error is calculated using Equation 31,
2
∑𝑛
𝑖=1(ŷ𝑖 −𝑦𝑖 )

(31) 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √

𝑛

where 𝑦̂𝑖 is the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike price by the barrier option pricing
model, 𝑦𝑖 is the observed INTL FCStone zero-cost accumulation strike price, and 𝑛 is the
number of observations.
Mean absolute error (MAE) is applied to quantify the average absolute difference
between the values predicted by a model and the observed data. By measuring the absolute
difference between observed values and predicted values, residuals are calculated.
Contrasting the mean absolute error values of opposing models indicates each model’s
prediction efficiency. The model with the lowest mean absolute error value maintains the
greatest forecasting ability as the predicted values fit the observed data efficiently; the
model achieving the highest mean absolute error value has the poorest predication
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proficiency since the predicted values cannot fit the data accurately. Mean absolute error
is calculated by Equation 32,
1

(32) 𝑀𝐴𝐸 = 𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑖=1|ŷ𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |
where 𝑦̂𝑖 is the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike price by the barrier option pricing
model, 𝑦𝑖 is the observed INTL FCStone zero-cost accumulation strike price, and 𝑛 is the
number of observations.
3.7 Agriculture Strategy Portfolios
Performance back-testing of the producer accumulator portfolio with other
agricultural marketing strategy portfolios provides relative benchmarks to producer
accumulator contract performance from a risk management and returns perspective. To
gauge producer accumulator performance relative to other strategies, we compare eight
agricultural marketing strategy portfolios. Risk management strategies chosen for
comparison include: long futures, protective put, covered call, long strangle, short strangle,
long straddle, short straddle, and collar.
Based on the nature of the eight strategies, we classify each strategy portfolio as a
hedging portfolio strategy, long option portfolio strategy, or short option portfolio strategy.
Table 4 lists the agricultural marketing strategy portfolios simulated. We categorize the
long futures portfolio, collar portfolio, and producer accumulator portfolio as hedging
strategies because they lock in a fixed price or a fixed price range for marketed bushels.
The long futures portfolio consistently sells bushels on a weekly basis at a fixed price
mirroring the weekly hedged price. Risk management through the collar strategy portfolio
maintains downside price protection, adding a price floor, by limiting upside profit
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potential to establish a fixed price range. While the long futures portfolio purely integrates
long futures contracts, the collar portfolio strategy consists of selling an out-of-the-money
call and buying an out-of-the-money put. Premiums from these options offset one another
and establish a price range. For collar portfolios simulated, premiums don’t offset
equivalently for all portfolios as the premium received for the out-of-the-money call and
the premium paid for the out-of-the-money put depend on the accumulation strike and
knock-out barrier established by our models. The producer accumulator portfolio prices
bushels on a weekly basis at the fixed accumulation strike price. Pricing bushels at the
accumulation strike price provides a premium to the underlying futures price at origination
and hedges bushels if the underlying futures price remains above the knock-out barrier
price.
Short option strategies generally benefit the seller when underlying price volatility
stays low and price remains range-bound over the strategy’s duration. Often, these
strategies consist of selling options either out-of-the money or at-the-money. The covered
call portfolio, short strangle portfolio, and short straddle portfolio sell options, therefore,
profiting when price volatility remains stagnant and underlying price remains in a range.
Using the covered call strategy by selling an out-of-the money call for risk reduction gives
the producer downside protection by receiving premium for capping upside profit potential.
Short strangle strategies, sell an out-of-the-money call and put, and short straddle
strategies, sell an at-the-money call and put, paying the option seller premium to cover the
risk associated with undesirable volatile market moves.
Long option strategies typically profit when underlying price volatility drastically
changes during the strategy’s duration. Generally, strategies consisting of buying options
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at-the-money or out-of-the-money fall into this category. The protective put portfolio, long
strangle portfolio, and long straddle portfolio purchase options, thus, profiting when
underlying price moves out of the normal price range due to uncommonly high volatility.
By buying an out-of-the-money put and paying a premium on each bushel, the protective
put strategy is a natural way for the producer to establish a price floor for their production.
Long strangle strategies buy an out-of-the-money call and put, while long straddle
strategies buy an at-the-money call and put. Under both strategies, option buyers pay
premium to the seller for risk coverage associated with unwanted volatile price changes.
Table 4. Agricultural Marketing Strategy Portfolios
Portfolio
Strategy

Portfolio
Type

Producer
Accumulator

Hedging
Portfolio

Long Futures

Hedging
Portfolio

Protective
Put
Covered
Call

Long
Option
Portfolio
Short
Option
Portfolio

Long
Strangle

Long
Option
Portfolio

Short
Strangle

Short
Option
Portfolio

Futures

Options

Short 2 OTM Down-and-Out Barrier Calls
Long 2
(X = Accumulation Level, H = Barrier
Futures
Level)
Contracts Long 1 ITM Down-and-Out Barrier Put (X
= Accumulation Level, H = Barrier Level)
Long 2
Futures
Contracts
Long 2
Long 2 OTM Vanilla Puts (X = Barrier
Futures
Level)
Contracts
Long 2
Short 2 OTM Vanilla Calls (X =
Futures
Accumulation Level)
Contracts
Long 1 OTM Vanilla Call (X =
Long 2
Accumulation Level)
Futures
Long 1 OTM Vanilla Put (X = Barrier
Contracts
Level)
Short 1 OTM Vanilla Call (X =
Long 2
Accumulation Level)
Futures
Short 1 OTM Vanilla Put (X = Barrier
Contracts
Level)
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Long
Straddle

Long
Option
Portfolio

Long 2
Futures
Contracts

Short
Straddle

Short
Option
Portfolio

Long 2
Futures
Contracts

Collar

Hedging
Portfolio

Long 2
Futures
Contracts

Long 1 ATM Vanilla Call (X = Futures
Price Level)
Long 1 ATM Vanilla Put (X = Futures
Price Level)
Short 1 ATM Vanilla Call (X = Futures
Price Level)
Short 1 ATM Vanilla Put (X = Futures
Price Level)
Short 1 OTM Vanilla Call (X =
Accumulation Level)
Long 1 OTM Vanilla Put (X = Barrier
Level)

All portfolio strategies contain long two futures contracts to simulate a naturally
long market position of 10,000 bushels. Producers incorporating the producer accumulator
contract into their risk management strategy will have corn or soybeans in the bin or in the
field where the physical bushel price is correlated with long futures price risk. Each
portfolio has no more than two futures contracts and two options. All simulated portfolios
will be based off the same referenced monthly futures contracts for futures price, start date,
end date, and maintain the same duration. Therefore, all portfolios provide a consistent
comparison to hedge or enhance returns to a portfolio consisting of 10,000 bushels of corn
or soybeans with expectations of exiting the long position at different durations between
20-60 weeks.
We quantify profitability and risk measures allowing the comparison of realized
performance and risk reduction of each portfolio strategy. For all portfolio strategies, we
calculate each synthetic portfolio contract’s average price, average daily return, average
daily log return, average daily portfolio standard deviation, average daily log portfolio
standard deviation, and average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio. A higher daily portfolio
standard deviation represents a higher variability of expected daily returns from the

52
portfolio. A lower daily portfolio standard deviation signifies a lower variability in
expected daily returns from the portfolio. The equation for daily portfolio standard
deviation is defined as,

(33) 𝜎𝑝 = √𝑤12 𝜎12 + 𝑤22 𝜎22 + 2𝑤1 𝑤2 𝜌1,2 𝜎1 𝜎2
where 𝜎𝑝 is the daily portfolio standard deviation, 𝑤1 is the proportion of the portfolio
invested in asset one, 𝑤2 is the proportion of the portfolio invested in asset two, 𝜎1 is the
daily standard deviation of returns for asset one, 𝜎2 is the daily standard deviation of returns
for asset two, and 𝜌1,2 is the correlation coefficient between the returns of asset one and
asset two. Sharpe ratio is a measure for calculating risk-adjusted return on an asset or
portfolio based on the return exceeding the risk-free rate of return per unit of risk. The
Sharpe ratio shows the added return of holding a risky asset over a risk-free asset subject
to the risky asset’s volatility. A higher Sharpe ratio signifies greater return per unit of risk
for the risky asset than the return on the risk-free asset. A lower Sharpe ratio denotes a
lower return per unit of risk on the risky asset than the risk-free asset. The equation for the
daily portfolio Sharpe ratio is shown by Equation 34,
(34) 𝑆𝑝 =

𝑟̅𝑝 −𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑝

where 𝑆𝑝 is the daily portfolio Sharpe ratio, 𝑟̅𝑝 is the expected daily log return, 𝑟𝑝 is the
daily risk-free rate of return on a 1-year U.S. Treasury Bill, and 𝜎𝑝 is the daily log portfolio
standard deviation. In addition to profitability and risk metrics, specific to the producer
accumulator portfolio, we quantify total bushel accumulation for each synthetic producer
accumulator contract.
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We analyze the average price performance of producer accumulator contracts
enacted following an uptrend, neutral trend, and downtrend of 25, 50, and 100 days. The
25-day, 50-day, and 100-day uptrends in corn are defined as having an average slope, or
the ratio of price and time changes between two points, greater than fifty cents for the prior
25, 50, or 100 trading days. The 25-day, 50-day, and 100-day neutral trends in corn are
characterized as an average slope between positive fifty and negative fifty cents for the
previous 25, 50, or 100 trading days. The 25-day, 50-day, and 100-day downtrends in corn
are defined as maintaining an average slope less than negative fifty cents for the former 25,
50, or 100 trading days. In soybeans, the 25-day, 50-day, and 100-day uptrends are
categorized as maintaining an average slope greater than one hundred cents for the prior
25, 50, or 100 trading days. The 25-day, 50-day, and 100-day neutral trends in soybeans
are quantified as having an average slope between positive one hundred and negative one
hundred cents for the former 25, 50, or 100 trading days. The 25-day, 50-day, and 100-day
downtrends in soybeans are defined as having an average slope less than negative one
hundred cents for the previous 25, 50, or 100 trading days.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In the knock-out barrier estimation results section, we review the results of the
knock-out barrier price equation by applying a simple linear regression measuring how
efficiently our predicted knock-out barrier price values fit the observed INTL FCStone
knock-out barrier price values. To designate the best option pricing model to value the
zero-cost accumulation strike prices for our synthetic producer accumulator contracts, we
compare the resulting fitness of predicted zero-cost accumulation strike prices, and
minimization of root-mean-square error and mean absolute error under each barrier option

54
pricing model. After back-testing the synthetic producer accumulator portfolios, along with
the other eight agricultural marketing strategy portfolios, we analyze profitability and the
risk reduction associated with each strategy portfolio. Average portfolio price, portfolio
risk reduction, and Sharpe ratio are focused on to determine overall portfolio strategy
performance. Specific to producer accumulator portfolios, we quantify bushel
accumulation in the concluding segment. Further, we evaluate the performance of producer
accumulator portfolios and long futures portfolios executed during non-growing season
months, growing season months, and following the technical trends: uptrend, neutral trend,
and downtrend.
4.1 Knock-Out Barrier Estimation Results
The intent of regressing the predicted knock-out barrier price values on the
observed INTL FCStone knock-out barrier price values is to validate, in both commodities,
the accuracy of our forecasted knock-out barrier price values computed by the knock-out
barrier price equation. Values predicted by the knock-out barrier price equation are based
on the referenced futures price and the number of days until contract expiration. If the
knock-out barrier price equation forecasts values that provide sufficient fit to the INTL
FCStone observed data, it provides confidence that a regression model predicts suitable
knock-out barrier prices for our synthetic producer accumulator contracts.
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Figure 2. Knock-Out Barrier in Corn – Observed vs Predicted
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Table 5. Knock-Out Barrier in Corn – Observed vs Predicted
Knock-Out Barrier Corn
Constant

19.0877**
(9.3251)
Predicted Knock-Out Barrier .9348***
Strike
(.0270)
R-square
.8734
F Test
1200.88
Observations
176
Coefficients are significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
In the corn market, the predicted knock-out barrier values from the price equation
closely approximate the observed INTL FCStone knock-out barrier price values. These
results are shown visually in Figure 2 and statistically in Table 5. With a beta for the
predicted knock-out barrier strike of .9348, an r-square of .8734, and a standard error for
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the beta coefficient of .0270, the predicted values fit the observed values efficiently.
Similarly, in soybeans, the knock-out barrier price equation demonstrates robust
forecasting results as the predicted knock-out barrier price values fit the observed INTL
FCStone data proficiently. These results are revealed graphically in Figure 3 and
numerically in Table 6. Producing a predicted knock-out barrier strike beta of .9644, an rsquare of .9311, and a standard error for the beta coefficient of .0189, the predicted values
for soybeans robustly explain the observed values. Knock-out barrier prices estimated in
soybeans fit the observed data slightly better than in corn. For knock-out barriers in corn
and soybeans, a Breusch-Pagan and White test were incorporated to ensure
homoscedasticity. The null hypothesis for homoscedasticity was accepted in the BreuschPagan and White test. Testing for autocorrelation, a Durbin-Watson test was implemented;
the null for no autocorrelation was accepted.
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Figure 3. Knock-Out Barrier in Soybeans – Observed vs Predicted
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Table 6. Knock-Out Barrier in Soybeans – Observed vs Predicted
Knock-Out Barrier Soybeans
Constant

37.6932**
(17.4963)
Predicted Knock-Out Barrier .9644***
Strike
(.0189)
R-square
.9311
F Test
2609.94
Observations
195
Coefficients are significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
Overall, the prediction ability of the knock-out barrier price equation is efficient in
both commodities. Accordingly, we feel confident valuing the knock-out barrier price for
the synthetic producer accumulator contracts with the knock-out barrier price equation
shown as Equation 9.
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4.2 Zero-Cost Accumulation Strike Model Results
To maximize zero-cost accumulation strike price accuracy for our synthetic
producer accumulator contracts, we analyze the fit of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR)
binomial tree model, Longstaff-Schwartz (LS) method, and finite difference (FD) explicit
approximation method to estimate strike prices given equivalent accumulator
specifications. By running a simple linear regression, we analyze the fit and bias of each
model’s predicted zero-cost accumulation strike prices against the INTL FCStone observed
accumulation strike prices. We also compare each model’s root-mean-square error and
mean absolute error with predicting the observed INTL FCStone strikes.
Figure 4. Zero-Cost Accumulation Strike in Corn – Observed vs Predicted
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Table 7. Zero-Cost Accumulation Strike in Corn – Observed vs Predicted
Model
Constant

CRR

LS

-14.6550**
-18.3887
(6.9364)
(7.3184)
Predicted Zero-Cost
1.0319***
1.0261***
Accumulation Strike (.0175)
(.0182)
R-square
.9524
.9482
F Test
3483.51
3186.63
Observations
176
176
Coefficients are significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).

FD
-13.7850**
(6.9740)
1.0367***
(.0177)
.9517
3431.51
176

Regressing the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike prices from each
methodology on the observed INTL FCStone accumulation strike prices in corn indicates
that the predicted values for all models fit the observed values well. Results are shown
graphically over the comparison period in Figure 4 and numerically in Table 7. All models
produced a beta coefficient near one indicating minimal bias. A high r-square also indicates
that the predicted values explain much of the variability in the observed strike values and
a low standard error implies low standard deviation. The CRR model has a beta for the
predicted zero-cost accumulation strike of 1.0319, it had the highest r-square, and lowest
standard error for the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike. The FD model estimates a
similar biased beta at 1.0367, it had the second highest r-square, and the second lowest
standard error for the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike. Performing the worst of all
models in approximating the zero-cost accumulation strike price in corn was the LS model
with a beta of 1.0261, it had the lowest r-square value, and the highest standard error of all
models for the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike at .0182. To check for
heteroskedasticity, a Breusch-Pagan and White test were applied. Results of the BreuschPagan and White test accepted the null hypothesis for homoscedasticity. We incorporated
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a Durbin-Watson test to test for autocorrelation. The null for no autocorrelation was
accepted.
Figure 5. Zero-Cost Accumulation Strike in Soybeans – Observed vs Predicted
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Table 8. Zero-Cost Accumulation Strike in Soybeans – Observed vs Predicted
Model
Constant

CRR

LS

14.1476
22.3021
(20.6685)
(22.4074)
Predicted Zero-Cost
.9848***
.9684***
Accumulation Strike (.0196)
(.0210)
R-square
.9287
.9160
F Test
2527.47
2116.77
Observations
196
196
Coefficients are significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).

FD
12.7772
(20.5056)
.9900***
(.0195)
.9299
2574.56
196
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When regressing predicted zero-cost accumulation strike prices for each model on
the observed INTL FCStone accumulation strike prices, all models predicted strike prices
fitting the observed data well in soybeans. Table 8 reports the results of all three models
and Figure 5 illustrates the strike prices over the period of comparison. The CRR model
predicted zero-cost accumulation strike prices had a beta of .9848, an r-square of .9287,
and a standard error for the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike beta at .0196. At .9684
for the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike beta, an r-square of .9160, and the highest
standard error for the predicted zero-cost accumulation strike of .0210, the LS model had
the worst fit of all models in soybeans. Alternatively, the FD model estimated a zero-cost
accumulation strike beta at .9900, the highest r-square at .9299, and the lowest standard
error of .0195. A Breusch-Pagan and White test were applied to check for
homoscedasticity; for both tests the null hypothesis for homoscedasticity was accepted. A
Durbin-Watson test was used to test for autocorrelation. We accept the null for no
autocorrelation.
Root-mean-square error (RMSE) evaluates model prediction accuracy by
comparing observed data and model predicted values. Table 9 displays results of the rootmean-square error (RMSE) test showing the CRR model ranking second behind the FD
model for the lowest degree of model error in corn. In soybeans, the CRR model produces
the second lowest RMSE after the FD model. The LS model produces the highest and worst
RMSE values in corn and soybeans, confirming higher comparable model error. RMSE for
the CRR model is low in both commodity markets; thus, the CRR model confirms that it
sufficiently values the zero-cost accumulation strike price with minimal error.
Table 9. Model Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE)
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Model
CRR
LS
FD

Corn

Soybean

5.30
9.38
4.99

9.54
15.20
9.53

Mean absolute error (MAE) measures the difference between observed values and
model predicted values by calculating average absolute error. Table 10 presents the mean
absolute error (MAE) test results. The CRR model realizes the second lowest MAE. The
FD model has the lowest MAE in corn. In soybeans, the CRR model has the lowest MAE
value. The LS model had the highest MAE in corn and soybeans affirming comparatively
higher prediction error than the other models evaluated. In both corn and soybeans, the
CRR model efficiently minimizes MAE. These results give us assurance in the ability of
the CRR model to accurately estimate the zero-cost accumulation strike for the synthetic
producer accumulator contracts we create.
Table 10. Model Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
Model
CRR
LS
FD

Corn

Soybean

3.94
8.03
3.81

7.34
12.27
7.72

The regression model estimates, root-square-mean error (RMSE) test, and mean
absolute error (MAE) test confirm that all models efficiently approximate the zero-cost
accumulation strike price. After reviewing the results of all methodologies, we elect the
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) binomial tree model to value the zero-cost accumulation
strike prices using Equation 5 for the synthetic producer accumulator contracts that we use
for performance back-testing.
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4.3 Average Price Analysis
The producer accumulator’s average price for corn was slightly less than the long
futures portfolio between 2008-2017. The producer accumulator portfolio had an average
price of $4.78/bu. The accumulator average price per bushel ranked it with the sixth highest
average price out of all nine simulated portfolios. The producer accumulator
underperformed the long futures portfolio by $.05/bu. Short option strategies expectantly
did well under low volatility range-bound markets, these include: the short strangle and
short straddle. In addition to the short option strategies, the covered call had the best
portfolio average bushel price over the aggregated period. Performing the worst were
portfolios with long options strategies, only profiting during high volatility and price
breakout that occurred less frequently than range bound markets. Table 11 reports the
average aggregate price of each portfolio strategy in corn and soybeans for the aggregate
period of 2008-2017.
Table 11. Portfolio Strategy Average Price in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Portfolio Strategy
Producer Accumulator
Long Futures
Protective Put
Covered Call
Long Strangle
Short Strangle
Long Straddle
Short Straddle
Collar
*average price per bushel in USD

Corn

Soybeans

$4.78
$4.83
$4.54
$5.25
$4.52
$5.22
$3.95
$5.79
$4.90

$11.43
$11.42
$10.95
$12.32
$10.99
$12.37
$9.95
$13.41
$11.64

During the aggregate period, the soybean producer accumulator portfolio achieved
the fifth highest average price out of the nine strategy portfolios. Outperforming the long
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futures portfolio from 2008-2017, the producer accumulator achieved an average price of
$11.43/bu. versus the average price of the long futures portfolio at $11.42/bu. Long option
portfolio strategies including: the long strangle, long straddle, and protective put realized
the lowest average prices in soybeans. Alternatively, the short option strategies consisting
of portfolios selling options had the highest average price per bushel over the aggregate
timeframe.
Figure 6. Portfolio Strategy Average Annual Price in Corn
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Figure 7. Portfolio Strategy Average Annual Price in Soybeans
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Figure 6 in corn and Figure 7 in soybeans present a time-series graph of average
annual price for each portfolio strategy from 2008-2017. The average annual price each
year of the producer accumulator portfolio and long futures portfolio were similar in both
commodities. Table 12 displays average aggregate price by portfolio valuation month for
producer accumulator strategy portfolios and long futures strategy portfolios from 20082017.
The producer accumulator portfolio, in corn, achieves an average price above
$4.80/bu. for contracts beginning between August and March with some months
outperforming the long futures portfolio. Lower average price for producer accumulator
contracts occur for contracts originated between April and July. They underperform the
long futures portfolio each month. Producer accumulator portfolios beginning during the
growing season underperform the long futures portfolio, but they outperform the long
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futures portfolio during the non-growing season. In soybeans, the producer accumulator
generates an average price above $11.50/bu. for contracts executed between July and
December beating the long futures portfolio each valuation month. Contracts valued
between January and June maintain lower average prices for producer accumulator
portfolios underperforming the long futures portfolio each month. Producer accumulator
portfolios in soybeans perform consistently with the long futures portfolio during the
growing and non-growing season.
Table 12. Average Price by Month in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Month

Corn –
Producer
Accumulator

January
$4.87
February
$4.89
March
$4.83
April
$4.69
May
$4.69
June
$4.57
July
$4.69
August
$4.83
September
$4.82
October
$4.87
November
$4.87
December
$4.83
Growing Season
$4.72
(April-September)
Non-Growing Season
$4.86
(October-March)
*average price per bushel in USD

Corn – Long
Futures

Soybeans –
Producer
Accumulator

Soybeans –
Long Futures

$4.79
$4.80
$4.86
$4.82
$4.89
$4.87
$4.84
$4.91
$4.82
$4.80
$4.80
$4.76
$4.86

$11.41
$11.26
$11.13
$11.35
$11.33
$11.32
$11.55
$11.67
$11.51
$11.51
$11.61
$11.50
$11.46

$11.44
$11.44
$11.40
$11.42
$11.55
$11.49
$11.44
$11.49
$11.30
$11.31
$11.42
$11.39
$11.45

$4.80

$11.40

$11.40

Table 13 presents average price for producer accumulator portfolios and long
futures portfolios categorized by trend type and trend length in days for corn and soybeans
from 2008-2017. We review the average price performance of producer accumulator
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contracts beginning following an uptrend, neutral trend, and downtrend of 25, 50, and 100
days. The producer accumulator in corn and soybeans had the highest average price
following an uptrend. Long futures portfolios enacted after an uptrend outperformed
producer accumulator portfolios enacted after an uptrend in corn. Long futures portfolios
beginning following an uptrend performed equivalently to producer accumulator portfolios
valued following an uptrend in soybeans. In corn, the producer accumulator outperformed
the long futures portfolio for contracts that began after the 50 and 100-day neutral trend,
underperforming in all other scenarios. In soybeans, the producer accumulator portfolio
outperformed the long futures portfolio for contracts originated or enacted after the 25 and
50-day uptrend, 50 and 100-day neutral trend, and 25 and 50-day downtrend. Producer
accumulator contracts beginning after the neutral trend had the lowest average price out of
all three trends in both commodities. Yet, producer accumulator portfolios executed after
a neutral trend had a higher average price than long futures portfolios beginning following
a neutral trend.
Table 13. Average Price by Trend in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Trend

Trend
Length

Corn –
Producer
Accumulator

Corn – Long
Futures

Soybeans –
Producer
Accumulator

Soybeans –
Long Futures

Uptrend

25-day
50-day
100-day
Average
25-day
50-day
100-day
Average
25-day
50-day
100-day

$5.04
$5.04
$5.37
$5.15
$4.48
$4.51
$4.47
$4.49
$4.75
$4.82
$4.91

$5.10
$5.10
$5.46
$5.22
$4.49
$4.49
$4.42
$4.47
$4.83
$4.92
$5.08

$11.74
$11.80
$11.81
$11.78
$11.14
$11.34
$11.32
$11.27
$11.31
$11.20
$11.55

$11.72
$11.76
$11.86
$11.78
$11.18
$11.25
$11.28
$11.24
$11.28
$11.27
$11.47

Neutral
Trend

Downtrend
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Average
$4.83
*average price per bushel in USD

$4.94

$11.35

$11.34

Figure 8 and 9 show the price ratio, December expiration in corn and November
expiration in soybeans, by comparing the average portfolio price of the producer
accumulator portfolio to the long futures portfolio. Each ratio is divided into quadrants by
year, month, week of the month, and day of the week, where each quadrant symbolizes the
price ratio of a producer accumulator portfolio compared to a long futures portfolio
executed on that date. Average daily portfolio price ratio around 1.2 is indicated by a deep
green hue and represents that the producer accumulator had a greater average price of
approximately 20% to that of the long futures only portfolio. The price of the producer
accumulator portfolio is determined by the bushels accumulated times the accumulation
strike price and the remaining unpriced bushels are sold at the referenced futures price on
the producer accumulator contract’s expiration date. A price ratio around 1 is shown in
white indicating an equivalent price to the average long futures price, and the red color
implies an accumulator price less than the long futures average price. A2 of the appendix
presents the price ratio in corn and soybeans for the March and July contract expirations.

69
Figure 8. Price Ratio in Corn – December Expiration

Figure 9. Price Ratio in Soybeans – November Expiration

4.4 Portfolio Risk Analysis
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In the corn market, the producer accumulator ranked fourth in portfolio risk over
the period ranging from 2008-2017. The accumulator had an average daily portfolio
standard deviation of $681.90. Alternatively, the long futures portfolio had an average daily
portfolio standard deviation of $836.69, the third highest portfolio risk. The producer
accumulator portfolio achieved a lower average daily standard deviation than the long
futures portfolio from 2008-2017 on an annual and aggregate basis. Reviewing the
performance of the long option portfolio strategies, the long straddle and strangle had the
greatest average daily portfolio risk, while the protective put portfolio significantly reduced
risk ranking it with the third lowest risk. The long strangle and straddle attained higher
average daily standard deviation than the long futures portfolio; hence, these strategies
accomplished no risk reduction, rather they attempted to enhance return by increasing risk.
Throughout this period, the risk management strategies including the collar, covered call,
and protective put had the lowest average daily sigma values at $523.88, $522.54, and
$577.89, respectively. Short option strategy portfolios, except for the covered call,
minimally reduce risk. Table 14 reveals aggregate average portfolio risk for each portfolio
strategy in corn and soybeans for the aggregate period of 2008-2017.
Table 14. Portfolio Risk in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Portfolio Strategy

Corn

Soybeans

Producer Accumulator
Long Futures
Protective Put
Covered Call
Long Strangle
Short Strangle
Long Straddle
Short Straddle
Collar

$681.90
$836.69
$577.89
$522.54
$880.85
$818.15
$892.72
$782.34
$523.88

$1189.14
$1571.26
$1201.49
$881.92
$1760.88
$1414.80
$1657.49
$1482.98
$999.35
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*average daily portfolio standard deviation in USD
From 2008-2017, the producer accumulator in soybeans had an average daily
standard deviation of $1,189.14. This performance ranks the producer accumulator
portfolio with the third lowest sigma value out of all nine portfolios. Divergent from corn,
the accumulator reduced standard deviation more than the protective put in soybeans. This
result is likely due to the higher positive soybean price volatility creating a greater
accumulation of bushels that were priced, thus reducing risk. Like the producer
accumulator portfolio in corn, the producer accumulator in soybeans had greater risk
reduction than the long futures portfolio. The long futures average daily portfolio standard
deviation was $1,571.26. On an aggregate and annual basis, the producer accumulator
produced a lower average daily portfolio standard deviation than the long futures portfolio.
The most risk reducing strategy was the covered call portfolio that had an average daily
portfolio sigma of $999.35. Ranging from 2008-2017, the short strangle and straddle
minimally reduced risk, while the long strangle and straddle increased risk compared to the
long portfolio strategy in soybeans.
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Average Daily Portfolio Standard Deviation

Figure 10. Strategy Portfolio Average Annual Portfolio Risk in Corn
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Figure 11. Strategy Portfolio Average Annual Portfolio Risk in Soybeans
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Figure 10 for corn and Figure 11 for soybeans illustrate time-series graphs of
strategy portfolio risk measured in average daily portfolio standard deviation from 20082017. Table 15 displays average daily portfolio risk by the valuation month for producer
accumulator strategy portfolios and long futures strategy portfolios during 2008-2017. In
corn and soybeans, all valuation months show comparably lower portfolio risk for the
producer accumulator portfolio than the long futures portfolio. Producer accumulator
portfolios in corn with valuation months between March and September had average daily
portfolio standard deviation above $675, while contracts beginning between October and
February had average daily portfolio risk below $675. In soybeans, producer accumulator
portfolios executed or valued between March and September had an average daily portfolio
standard deviation above $1,150; contracts executed between October and February
attained an average daily portfolio standard deviation less than $1,150. As expected,
portfolio risk for the producer accumulator portfolio and long futures portfolio is higher
during the growing season than during the non-growing season in both commodities.
Table 15. Risk by Month in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Month

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November

Corn –
Producer
Accumulator

Corn – Long
Futures

Soybeans –
Producer
Accumulator

Soybeans –
Long Futures

$630.36
$663.21
$710.02
$723.27
$743.95
$748.49
$688.56
$696.42
$681.04
$643.94
$635.82

$805.65
$825.51
$865.68
$871.28
$888.15
$889.20
$842.66
$837.57
$822.15
$779.23
$798.77

$1,062.58
$1,077.51
$1,150.56
$1,225.77
$1,275.16
$1,379.96
$1,350.77
$1,301.36
$1,237.51
$1,112.96
$1,063.91

$1,483.69
$1,519.27
$1,627.48
$1,659.67
$1,691.65
$1,694.13
$1,628.07
$1,585.24
$1,548.63
$1,488.12
$1,468.34
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December
$601.11
$801.87
Growing Season
$713.62
$858.50
(April-September)
Non-Growing Season
$647.41
$812.79
(October-March)
*average daily portfolio standard deviation in USD

$1,026.02
$1,295.09

$1,477.41
$1,634.57

$1,082.26

$1,510.72

Table 16 illustrates average daily portfolio standard deviation for producer
accumulator portfolios and long futures portfolios broken down by trend type and trend
length in days for corn and soybeans from 2008-2017. We analyze risk reduction by
measuring average daily portfolio standard deviation of producer accumulator contracts
beginning succeeding an uptrend, neutral trend, and downtrend consisting of 25, 50, and
100 days. Following all trends, producer accumulator portfolios achieved lower average
daily portfolio standard deviation than the equivalent long futures portfolio in both corn
and soybeans. Producer accumulator contracts following a neutral trend had the lowest
average daily portfolio standard deviation in corn and soybeans. Contracts executed after
the 25-day neutral trend had the lowest average daily portfolio standard deviation for both
long futures and producer accumulator portfolios in corn. Contracts valued after the 50day neutral trend had the lowest average daily portfolio standard deviation in soybeans. In
both commodities, producer accumulator contracts following an uptrend maintain the
highest average daily portfolio standard deviation. Corn and soybean producer accumulator
contracts and long futures portfolios valued following the 100-day uptrend had the highest
average daily portfolio standard deviation out of all trends and trend lengths.
Table 16. Risk by Trend in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Trend

Trend
Length

Corn –
Producer
Accumulator

Corn – Long
Futures

Soybeans –
Producer
Accumulator

Soybeans –
Long Futures

Uptrend

25-day

$771.26

$936.08

$1,305.07

$1,658.45
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50-day
$788.01
$940.01
100-day
$835.72
$993.90
Average
$803.49
$956.66
Neutral
25-day
$569.26
$700.71
Trend
50-day
$576.91
$722.81
100-day
$592.82
$723.22
Average
$579.66
$715.58
Downtrend 25-day
$678.46
$836.64
50-day
$684.66
$844.11
100-day
$696.54
$883.08
Average
$686.55
$854.61
*average daily portfolio standard deviation in USD

$1,374.28
$1,560.40
$1,413.25
$1,019.77
$1,015.97
$1,039.50
$1,025.08
$1,170.21
$1,164.62
$1,188.43
$1,174.42

$1,690.31
$1,828.20
$1,725.65
$1,433.59
$1,420.35
$1,434.68
$1,429.54
$1,560.66
$1,590.44
$1,631.54
$1,594.21

Figure 12 in corn with December expiration and Figure 13 in soybeans with
November expiration show the sigma ratio represented as producer accumulator portfolio
risk to long futures portfolio risk. Broken down by year, month, week of the month, and
day of the week, each square symbolizes the sigma ratio of the producer accumulator
portfolio compared to the long futures portfolio executed or valued on the date embodied
by that square. The deep green color specifies a sigma ratio around 1. In this case, the
producer accumulator portfolio has an equivalent average daily portfolio standard
deviation to the long futures portfolio. Bushels are sold at the referenced futures price upon
producer accumulator contract expiration if the producer accumulator knock-out occurs
prior to selling all contracted bushels. Therefore, early knock-out scenarios minimally
manage risk causing a sigma ratio close to 1 as most bushels are sold at the long futures
price at contract expiration. Boxes colored gold to deep red show instances where the
producer accumulator portfolio decreases and significantly decreases average daily
portfolio standard deviation compared to the long futures portfolio. A3 of the appendix
displays the sigma ratio in corn and soybeans for the March and July contract expirations.

76
Figure 12. Sigma Ratio in Corn – December Expiration

Figure 13. Sigma Ratio in Soybeans – November Expiration

4.5 Sharpe Ratio Analysis
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In corn, the producer accumulator portfolio exhibited the best risk adjusted
performance by outperforming all other portfolios. The producer accumulator portfolio
achieved an average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio of .081 over the 2008-2016 period.
Moreover, on an average annual basis, the producer accumulator had the best portfolio
Sharpe ratio each year during 2009-2016. In 2008, the short strangle and short straddle had
an incrementally better Sharpe ratio edging out the producer accumulator portfolio. Out of
all nine strategies, only four strategy portfolios maintained a positive average daily
portfolio Sharpe ratio from 2008-2016. Portfolios with a positive Sharpe ratio on an
average aggregate basis include: the producer accumulator portfolio, the short straddle
portfolio, the short strangle portfolio, and the covered call portfolio. Obtaining a -.013
average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio, the long futures portfolio had the fourth worst Sharpe
ratio out of all portfolios. All long option portfolios averaged negative Sharpe ratios; the
protective put portfolio had the worst risk adjusted return at a -.044 Sharpe ratio. Table 17
displays each portfolio’s average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio during 2008-2016 in corn and
soybeans.
Table 17. Portfolio Sharpe Ratio in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2016
Portfolio Strategy
Producer Accumulator
Long Futures
Protective Put
Covered Call
Long Strangle
Short Strangle
Long Straddle
Short Straddle
Collar
*average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio

Corn

Soybeans

.081
-.013
-.044
.013
-.030
.007
-.040
.021
-.014

.178
.005
-.017
.041
-.009
.026
-.022
.040
.009
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Ranking first on an aggregate and annual average basis from 2008-2016, the
soybean producer accumulator portfolio upheld an aggregate average daily portfolio
Sharpe ratio of .178. The long futures portfolio underperformed the producer accumulator
portfolio with an average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio of .005 over the period. Portfolios
performed better in the soybean market than in the corn market with only three out of the
nine portfolios producing a negative average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio. Short option
strategy portfolios like the covered call portfolio, the short strangle portfolio, and the short
straddle portfolio had some of the highest average daily portfolio Sharpe ratios. In contrast
to the corn market, the protective put portfolio in soybeans was not the worst performer.
Instead, the long strangle portfolio ranked last signifying poor risk-adjusted return. The
collar portfolio turned from a negative Sharpe ratio in corn to a positive average daily
portfolio Sharpe ratio in soybeans. All long option strategy portfolios maintained a negative
average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio from 2008-2016.
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Figure 14. Strategy Portfolio Average Annual Sharpe Ratio in Corn
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Figure 15. Strategy Portfolio Average Annual Sharpe Ratio in Soybeans
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Figure 14 for corn and Figure 15 for soybeans present each strategy portfolio’s
average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio in a time-series graph on an average annual basis from
2008-2016. Table 18 presents average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio by valuation month for
producer accumulator strategy portfolios and long futures strategy portfolios during 20082016. In both corn and soybeans, the producer accumulator portfolio had a higher average
daily Sharpe ratio than the long futures portfolio for all valuation months, the growing
season period, and non-growing season period. The producer accumulator in corn had
average daily portfolio Sharpe ratios above .1 for contract portfolios beginning between
September and February and Sharpe ratios under .1 for contracts executed between March
and August. The producer accumulator in soybeans had higher average daily portfolio
Sharpe ratios above .16 for contracts originated between September and March and average
daily portfolio Sharpe ratios under .16 for contracts that began between April and August.
Producer accumulator Sharpe ratios were higher during the non-growing season than the
growing season for corn and soybeans conveying superior risk adjusted return for producer
accumulators executed or enacted during non-growing season valuation months.
Table 18. Sharpe Ratio by Month in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2016
Month

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September

Corn –
Producer
Accumulator

Corn – Long
Futures

Soybeans –
Producer
Accumulator

Soybeans –
Long Futures

.126
.112
.050
.044
.047
.038
.058
.067
.106

-.014
-.019
-.010
-.014
-.016
-.019
-.014
-.012
-.008

.225
.226
.171
.156
.145
.096
.113
.142
.186

.003
-.007
.008
-.002
-.001
-.007
.000
.005
.009

81
October
.105
November
.106
December
.126
Growing Season
.060
(April-September)
Non-Growing Season
.104
(October-March)
*average daily portfolio Sharpe Ratio

-.009
-.010
-.009
-.014

.220
.217
.226
.140

.018
.018
.013
.001

-.012

.214

.009

Table 19 exhibits average daily portfolio Sharpe ratios for producer accumulator
and long futures portfolios categorized by trend type and trend length in days for contracts
in corn and soybeans from 2008-2016. We investigate risk adjusted return by quantifying
average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio for producer accumulator contracts executed after an
uptrend, neutral trend, and downtrend. Each trend is split into trend lengths of 25, 50, and
100 days. Producer accumulator portfolios, beginning following all trends and trend
lengths, had a higher average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio than the corresponding long
futures portfolio in corn and soybeans. Producer accumulator contracts valued after a
neutral trend had the highest average daily portfolio Sharpe ratios in corn and soybeans.
The long futures portfolio realized the highest average daily portfolio Sharpe ratios for
contracts beginning following a downtrend in corn and soybeans. In corn, producer
accumulator contracts executed after a 25-day neutral trend had the highest average daily
portfolio Sharpe ratio, while contracts valued after a 50-day uptrend generated the lowest
average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio. In soybeans, producer accumulator portfolios
beginning following a 25-day neutral trend achieved the best average daily portfolio Sharpe
ratio; contracts executed after a 100-day uptrend had the worst average daily portfolio
Sharpe ratio. In both commodities, producer accumulator contracts and long futures
portfolios realized the lowest average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio following an uptrend.
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Table 19. Sharpe Ratio by Trend in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2016
Trend

Uptrend

Trend
Length

Corn –
Producer
Accumulator

25-day
.052
50-day
.032
100-day
.037
Average
.040
Neutral
25-day
.125
Trend
50-day
.122
100-day
.092
Average
.113
Downtrend 25-day
.078
50-day
.087
100-day
.105
Average
.090
*average daily portfolio Sharpe Ratio

Corn – Long
Futures

Soybeans –
Producer
Accumulator

Soybeans –
Long Futures

-.021
-.024
-.025
-.023
-.013
-.011
-.010
-.011
-.006
-.005
-.005
-.005

.142
.118
.081
.114
.214
.212
.205
.210
.192
.203
.203
.199

-.004
-.007
-.018
-.010
.001
.001
.006
.003
.017
.022
.028
.022

Figure 16 in corn with December expiration and Figure 17 in soybeans with
November expiration display the average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio for all simulated
producer accumulator portfolios. Split into tranches by year, month, week of the month,
and day of the week, each tranche signifies the producer accumulator portfolio Sharpe ratio
where the valuation date or start date of each simulated accumulator portfolio is represented
by each tranche. Tranches with a deep green color indicate average daily portfolio Sharpe
ratio around .4 or higher conveying the producer accumulator to have a superior return per
unit of volatility compared to the alternative risk-free portfolio of 1-year treasury bills.
White tranches represent accumulator portfolios with an average daily portfolio Sharpe
ratio around 0 showing the producer accumulator to have an equivalent return per unit of
volatility to the alternative risk-free portfolio of 1-year treasury bills. The pink implies a
producer accumulator portfolio average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio that is slightly negative
displaying the producer accumulator to have worse return per unit of volatility than the
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alternative risk-free portfolio of 1-year treasury bills. A4 of the appendix exhibits the
average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio in corn and soybeans for the March and July contract
expirations.
Figure 16. Producer Accumulator Sharpe Ratio in Corn – December Expiration
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Figure 17. Producer Accumulator Sharpe Ratio in Soybeans – November Expiration

4.6 Bushel Accumulation Analysis
Aggregate results from 2008-2017 in corn indicate an average bushel accumulation
of 3,165 bushels for producer accumulator contracts contracted to accumulate 5,000
bushels. Out of 5,117 producer accumulator contracts simulated in corn, 3,920 contracts or
76.6% of all producer accumulator portfolios accumulated less than 5,000 bushels; 1,197
contracts or 23.4% of the total producer accumulator portfolios accumulated more than
5,000 bushels. On an annual basis from 2008-2017, 2010 and 2017 attained the highest
number of average annual bushels accumulated. For 2010, 47.6% of contracts priced more
than 5,000 total bushels with an annual average of 6,380 bushels priced. In 2017, an annual
average of 5,362 bushels were priced with 97.8% of contracts pricing more than 5,000
bushels. The years of 2008 and 2013 had the lowest quantity of bushels accumulated at
1,240 and 1,752. In 2008, 95.3% of contracts sold less than 5,000 bushels. Comparable
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results occurred in 2013 with 93.5% of contracts selling under 5,000 bushels. Table 20
presents results from corn and soybean bushels accumulated from 2008-2017 on an average
annual and average aggregate basis.
Table 20. Annual Bushels Accumulated in Corn and Soybeans
Year

Corn

2008
1,240
2009
2,385
2010
6,380
2011
2,947
2012
4,335
2013
1,752
2014
2,615
2015
2,361
2016
3,507
2017
5,362
2008-2017
3,165
*average quantity of bushels accumulated

Soybean
1,585
3,727
8,169
3,421
5,830
5,573
3,015
4,330
6,228
4,979
4,752

From 2008-2017, producer accumulator portfolio aggregate results in the soybeans
show an average bushel accumulation of 4,752 bushels. Simulating 5,093 contracts in
soybeans, 2,635 contracts, or 51.7% of the total simulated producer accumulator portfolios
accumulated less than 5,000 bushels; 2,458 contracts or 48.3% of all simulated producer
accumulator portfolios accumulated more than 5,000 bushels. Ranging from 2008-2017,
2010 and 2016 had the highest number of average annual bushels accumulated. In 2010,
an annual average of 8,169 bushels were accumulated with 91.2% of contracts pricing more
than 5,000 total bushels. During 2016, 78.8% of contracts priced more than 5,000 bushels
with an annual average of 6,228 bushels accumulated. Accumulating the lowest quantity
of bushels, 2008 and 2014 average bushels accumulated were 1,585 and 3,015. In 2008,
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94.8% of contracts accumulated less than 5,000 bushels. Similarly, 78.1% of contracts in
2014 accumulated less than 5,000 bushels.
Figure 18. Bushels Accumulated Histogram in Corn 2008-2017

Figure 19. Bushels Accumulated Histogram in Soybeans 2008-2017
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Figure 18 for corn and Figure 19 for soybeans illustrate the frequency of bushels
accumulated from simulated producer accumulator contracts accumulating specific bushel
ranges between 0-10,000 bushels. The frequency of bushels accumulated is skewed toward
lower bushels in corn. Frequency in soybeans is more evenly distributed, but shows skew
towards higher and lower bushel bins near 0 and 10,000. Table 21 displays the average
bushels accumulated in corn and soybeans from 2008-2017 broken down by producer
accumulator portfolio valuation month. Producer accumulator contracts accumulate a
higher quantity of bushels when contracts originate or begin during the non-growing
season, 9.3% more in corn and 21.3% more in soybeans, than when contracts begin during
the growing season. In corn, producer accumulators executed between August and
February accumulated more than 3,000 bushels; producer accumulators valued between
March and July accumulated less than 3,000 bushels. In soybeans, producer accumulators
beginning between October and March accumulated more than 5,000 bushels; producer
accumulators executed between April and September accumulated less than 5,000 bushels.
Table 21. Bushels Accumulated by Month in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Month

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November

Corn

% Change
from Prior
Month

3,489
3,214
2,855
2,713
2,950
2,861
2,770
3,011
3,870
3,222
3,409

-10.04%
-8.53%
-12.58%
-5.24%
8.02%
-3.08%
-3.30%
8.00%
22.20%
-20.11%
5.47%

Soybeans

5,025
5,428
5,667
4,927
4,463
3,381
3,720
3,880
4,789
5,359
5,167

% Change
from Prior
Month
-5.95%
7.43%
4.22%
-15.01%
-10.40%
-32.02%
9.13%
4.11%
18.98%
10.64%
-3.71%
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December
3,839
11.21%
Growing Season
3,029
-10.20%
(April-September)
Non-Growing Season
3,338
9.25%
(October-March)
*average quantity of bushels accumulated

5,323
4,193

2.94%
-27.06%

5,328

21.30%

Table 22 displays average corn and soybean bushels accumulated by producer
accumulator contracts categorized by trend type and length of trend in days from 20082017. In this table, we evaluate the quantity of bushels accumulated by producer
accumulator contracts valued following an uptrend, neutral trend, and downtrend of 25, 50,
and 100-days in length. To show the distribution of producer accumulator contracts for
each trend type and trend length, we list the number of producer accumulator contracts in
corn and soybeans fitting the criteria of each trend type and trend length. In corn and
soybeans, producer accumulator contract portfolios accumulated the highest number of
bushels when they began after a downtrend. Specifically, the highest quantity of bushels
was accumulated for producer accumulator portfolios beginning following a 100-day
downtrend in corn and a 50-day downtrend in soybeans. Contracts in both commodities
accumulated the lowest quantity of bushels when accumulator portfolios were executed
after an uptrend. Producer accumulator portfolios executed or enacted after a 50-day
uptrend in corn and a 100-day uptrend in soybeans had the lowest quantity of bushels
accumulated.
Table 22. Bushels Accumulated by Trend in Corn and Soybeans 2008-2017
Trend

Trend
Length

Corn –
Producer
Accumulator

Corn – # of
Contracts in
Trend

Soybeans –
Producer
Accumulator

Soybeans – #
of Contracts
in Trend

Uptrend

25-day
50-day

2,719
2,324

1,804
1,571

4,086
3,570

1,988
1,627
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100-day
2,328
Average
2,457
Neutral
25-day
3,497
Trend
50-day
3,406
100-day
3,018
Average
3,307
Downtrend 25-day
3,318
50-day
3,649
100-day
4,147
Average
3,705
*average quantity of bushels accumulated

1,119
1,498
1,404
1,758
2,572
1,911
1,918
1,772
1,360
1,683

2,969
3,542
5,305
5,135
5,106
5,182
5,115
5,607
5,586
5,436

938
1,518
1,338
1,898
3,116
2,117
1,816
1,592
1,013
1,474

Figure 20 signifies bushels accumulated for December expiration in corn and
Figure 21 characterizes bushels accumulated for November expiration in soybeans. Figure
20 and 21 show the quantity of bushels accumulated from 0-10,000 for all simulated
producer accumulator contracts. Organized into squares based on year, month, week of the
month, and day of the week, each individual square represents the date a simulated
producer accumulator portfolio was enacted. The color of each square is dependent on the
total quantity of bushels accumulated by the producer accumulator enacted on the date the
square represents. A deep green color signifies accumulation of bushels close to 10,000
bushels, the gold hue represents bushel accumulation around 5,000 bushels, and the bright
red signifies accumulation of bushels close to or at zero bushels.
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Figure 20. Bushels Accumulated in Corn – December Expiration

Figure 21. Bushels Accumulated in Soybeans – November Expiration

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
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5.1 Summary
The producer accumulator portfolio performed similarly to the long futures
portfolio with respect to average price. Our analysis shows the producer accumulator
historically narrowly underperformed the long futures portfolio in corn, $4.78/bu. versus
$4.83/bu., and marginally outperformed the long futures portfolio in soybeans, $11.43/bu.
versus $11.42/bu. Producer accumulator contracts in corn beginning during the growing
season underperformed the long futures portfolio, but outperformed long futures during the
non-growing season. In soybeans, producer accumulator portfolios originated during the
growing season and non-growing season performed similarly to the long futures portfolio
executed or valued during the growing and non-growing season. In both corn and soybeans,
producer accumulator portfolios achieved the highest average price when contracts were
executed after an uptrend whether the uptrend ranged from 25 to 100-days. Producer
accumulator contracts valued after a 25 to 100-day neutral trend had the lowest average
price in both commodities.
When risk is taken into consideration in addition to return, the producer
accumulator in corn and soybeans outperformed all other strategy portfolios. Average daily
portfolio Sharpe ratio on an annual and aggregate basis is greater than all strategy portfolios
from 2009-2017 in corn and 2008-2017 in soybeans. The producer accumulator portfolio,
in both commodities, had a higher average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio than the long futures
portfolio for all valuation months, the growing season period, and the non-growing season
period. In corn and soybeans, higher Sharpe ratios occurred for contracts originated during
the non-growing season than during the growing season conveying superior risk adjusted
return for producer accumulator contracts executed during non-growing season months.
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Producer accumulator contracts beginning following all trends types and trend lengths in
corn and soybeans realized a higher average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio than the
corresponding long futures portfolio. In both commodities, producer accumulator contracts
that began after a neutral trend attained the highest average daily portfolio Sharpe ratios;
however, the long futures portfolio in corn and soybeans had the highest average daily
portfolio Sharpe ratios for contracts valued following a downtrend. Producer accumulator
contracts and long futures portfolios in corn and soybeans had the lowest average daily
portfolio Sharpe ratio when contracts began after an uptrend.
Producer accumulator portfolios, in both commodity markets, produced an average
daily portfolio standard deviation that is much lower than the long futures average daily
portfolio standard deviation. All valuation months present lower portfolio risk for the
producer accumulator portfolio than the long futures portfolio. Long futures and producer
accumulator portfolio risk is greater during the growing season than during the nongrowing season in both commodities. Producer accumulator portfolios executed or enacted
after an uptrend, neutral trend, and downtrend, ranging from 25 to 100-days in length,
achieved a lower average daily portfolio standard deviation than the corresponding long
futures portfolio. In corn and soybeans, producer accumulator contracts executed after a
neutral trend realized the lowest average daily portfolio standard deviation, while producer
accumulator contracts executed following an uptrend maintained the highest and worst
average daily portfolio standard deviation. Producer accumulator contracts reduce risk
compared to long futures based on the quantification of average daily portfolio standard
deviation verifying the producer accumulator as an efficient way to manage risk.
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In corn and soybeans, the producer accumulator is found to price less bushels than
it originally contracts. During the 2008-2017 timeframe, accumulated bushels averaged
3,165 bushels in corn and 4,752 bushels in soybeans. Frequency of bushels accumulated is
skewed toward lower bushel bins in corn, whereas the distribution is more consistent in
soybeans, but producer accumulators accumulating soybeans show some skew toward
higher and lower bushel bins. When contracts originate during the non-growing season,
producer accumulator contracts accumulated a higher quantity of bushels, 9.3% more in
corn and 21.3% more in soybeans, than when contracts begin during the growing season.
Producer accumulator contracts in corn and soybeans accumulated the highest number of
bushels when the contract began bushel accumulation following a downtrend. In both
commodities, accumulator portfolios accumulated the lowest quantity of bushels when the
accumulator was executed after an uptrend.
5.2 Producer Implications
Based on our quantitative research, we deem the producer accumulator contract to
be an efficient risk management strategy for producers to employ in corn and soybean
commodity markets. Our research shows that accumulator average price received per
bushel is similar to the average futures price during the contracted period, but risk is
reduced by adopting a producer accumulator contract. Reduction of risk, while maintaining
a similar average price to the futures price results in a higher Sharpe ratio indicating a more
efficient portfolio according to Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952). Thus,
producers would be rationally expected to adopt the producer accumulator contract into
their grain marketing strategy.
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Our research supports that producers may optimally execute producer accumulator
contracts during non-growing season months between October and March rather than
growing season months between April and September. Producer accumulator portfolios
valued during non-growing season months produce a similar average price to the average
price of the long futures portfolio and a higher average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio because
of lower portfolio risk measured by standard deviation. Moreover, accumulators enacted
during the non-growing season exhibited higher bushel accumulation than producer
accumulators executed or valued during the growing season. Therefore, producers may
achieve greater risk reduction by executing accumulator contracts during the non-growing
season to enhance their risk adjusted return.
When incorporating technical trend into performance, producers receive a higher
average price, higher risk adjusted return and lower risk, and greater bushel accumulation
following different trend types. In corn and soybeans, our research illustrates that the best
average price for producer accumulator contracts occurs for contracts valued after an
uptrend. The highest average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio and lowest average daily portfolio
standard deviation is realized by contracts executed after a neutral trend. And, the highest
bushel accumulated occurred for contract portfolios originated or valued after a downtrend.
Producers implementing the producer accumulator contract should consider their primary
goal to decide which trend type to follow. Risk seeking producers seeking higher reward
and correspondingly higher risk should consider executing their producer accumulator
contract after an uptrend to receive the highest average price. Risk adverse producers
seeking lower risk and thus lower reward should consider beginning their producer
accumulator contract following a neutral trend to receive the highest risk adjusted return
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and lowest risk. If producers are risk neutral and seek the highest risk adjusted return, they
should consider beginning their producer accumulator contract following a neutral trend.
Price-time path of the referenced futures price among the accumulation strike price
and knock-out barrier affects the quantity of bushels accumulated. On average, bushel
accumulation is less than the contracted 5,000 bushels in corn and close to the contracted
bushel quantity in soybeans. With this finding, producers should consider a hedging
account to defend their producer accumulator using vanilla options and futures contracts
during unfavorable price movements to manage risk. Producer accumulator contracts do
not reduce basis risk; therefore, producers should consider incorporating a basis contract
to reduce basis risk when adopting a producer accumulator contract.
Research conducted by Lam et al. (2009), Kwong et al. (2012), and Cheng (2010)
showed simulation results confirming large negative asymmetric risk for the accumulator.
These papers concluded the accumulator to be a biased and risky investment strategy for
investors purchasing assets through the accumulator. Our research on the producer
accumulator in corn and soybean commodity markets differs from prior research on the
consumer accumulator. We show the producer accumulator to offer overall risk reduction
and superior risk adjusted return compared to the other strategy portfolios we back-test.
Our research dismisses the belief that the producer accumulator suffers from the same
negative asymmetric risk as the consumer accumulator. We verify that the producer
accumulator is a favorable risk management tool for corn and soybean producers to
employ.
5.3 Research Extension
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Our producer accumulator contract research could be extended by simulating
producer accumulator portfolios prior to 2008 to gain further insight and perspective of
historical producer accumulator performance. It may be beneficial to extend research
associated with downside risk by quantifying downside deviation via the Sortino ratio.
Further research could be conducted by evaluating producer accumulator contract
performance during technical trends varying in length other than the 25, 50, and 100-day
trends tested in this research. The methodology outlined in our research could be extended
to the producer accumulator with Euro double up and the producer accumulator with Euro
double up and guaranteed quantity to investigate zero-cost structure, average price, average
daily portfolio standard deviation, average daily portfolio Sharpe ratio, and bushel
accumulation.
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APPENDIX
A1. INTL FCStone Producer Accumulator Contract
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A2. Price Ratio in Corn and Soybeans – March and July Expiration
Price Ratio in Corn – March Expiration

Price Ratio in Corn – July Expiration
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Price Ratio in Soybeans – March Expiration

Price Ratio in Soybeans – July Expiration
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A3. Sigma Ratio in Corn and Soybeans – March and July Expiration
Sigma Ratio in Corn – March Expiration

Sigma Ratio in Corn – July Expiration
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Sigma Ratio in Soybeans – March Expiration

Sigma Ratio in Soybeans – July Expiration
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A4. Producer Accumulator Sharpe Ratio in Corn and Soybeans – March and July
Expiration
Producer Accumulator Sharpe Ratio in Corn – March Expiration

Producer Accumulator Portfolio Ratio in Corn – July Expiration
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Producer Accumulator Sharpe Ratio in Soybeans – March Expiration

Producer Accumulator Sharpe Ratio in Soybeans – July Expiration
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A5. Bushels Accumulated in Corn and Soybeans – March and July Expiration
Bushels Accumulated in Corn – March Expiration

Bushels Accumulated in Corn – July Expiration
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Bushels Accumulated in Soybeans – March Expiration

Bushels Accumulated in Soybeans – July Expiration

